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Some of the most highly charged issues today involve questions of
sex discrimnation in the workplace.' Debates over these issues are not
confined to scholarly legal journals but occur in bars, on factory floors, in
the popular press, on talk radio, and at the proverbial office water cooler.
Views are strongly held and emotionally defended. All too often, reason
is displaced by rhetoric, and discussions turn into polemics, name-calling,
and argument by epithet.' Voices are raised, but views are rarely
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young Umversity Law School. I thank Professors David
Dominguez, Cheryl B. Preston, and Gerald R. Williams for their extremely helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. One can even debate whether the proper term is gender discrmnnation or sex discrim-
nation. See Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimnation or Gender Inequality, 57 FORDHAM L. REv
941, 946 (1989) (arguing that sex and gender should be distinguished); Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effenunate Man in the Law and
Fenumst Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 9-18 (1995) (asserting that treating sex and gender as
interchangeable has led to confusion m law); Richard A. Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41
DEPAUL L. REv 981, 982 (1992) (maintaining that the use of "gender" instead of "sex" carries
the substantive message that differences between women and men are social phenomena, not
biologically based); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV 1, 5 (1995) (arguing that there is no
principled way to distinguish sex from gender); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REV 797, 800 (1989) (asserting that sex and gender are different). Even Justice
Scalia has entered into tls debate. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436
n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "sex discrimination" is the proper term be-
cause it refers to physical distinctions between the sexes whereas "gender" refers to the cultural
aspect of being feminine or masculine). Because I do not consider this to be a critical issue for
purposes of tins Article, I will use the terms interchangeably.
2. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Prinmer on Femnist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 3 (1988) (noting that "feminism" can be "a dirty word" that generates substantial
hostility); Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REv 1227, 1308
(1994) (observing that, even within feminst circles, there is name calling); Kenneth Lasson,
Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV L. REv 926, 947-
48 (1990) (characterizing feminist writers as "poobahs" who are "either a bunch of bumbleheads
or a barrelful of bad writers," and their work as "polysyllabic sludge" and "jargon and gibber-
ish"); Cathleen Decker, Affirmative Action: Why Battle Erupted, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1995, at
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changed. If anything, the intensity of the debate appears to be increasing,
as workers feel less secure in their jobs and consequently less willing to
make accommodations for those whom they view as potential workplace
competitors.3
A number of factors contribute to the complexity of the debate on
sex discrimination in employment. First, the issues are not bipolar in the
sense that one votes either "for" or "against" gender equality. Instead,
there are myriad views, falling along a continuum and merging into one
another. People can agree that the overall goal of equality in the work-
place is worth pursuing but advance widely different ideas regarding how
to achieve that goal.4 Indeed, this disparity of views is probably nowhere
Al (quoting a California politician as equating racial and gender preferences with the Nazi at-
tempt to destroy the Jews).
3. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Le-
gal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 303, 303-04 (noting the current backlash against feminism);
Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO.
L. REV. 975, 999 (1993) (observing that judicial decisions regarding sexual equality can spark
resentment and a powerful backlash); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersec-
tions, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 639, 656-57 (1993)
(noting that the feminist movement has created backlash against black women); Beth L. Green &
Nancy F. Russo, Work and Family Roles: Selected Issues, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 685,
688 (1993) ("Evidence suggests that as the proportion of women increases in a traditionally male
field, the attitudes of males toward women change from neutral to resistant.... [Some re-
searchers] suggest that lack of job security underlies men's negative responses to 'new women'
in blue-collar occupations."); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Woman: A Test for Sex-Based Har-
assment, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1995) (describing sexual harassment cases as "a light-
ning rod for sharply divergent views" and an "unusually fervent public debate" about the place
of women in the workplace); Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1699, 1704 (1990) (stating that progress on women's issues frequently leads to a back-
lash); Thomas B. Edsall, Understanding Oklahoma, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1995, at C1
("[Afffirmative action and sexual harassment policies have helped create for many men a sense
of private siege . . . ."); Jonathan Freedman, Civil Right-The Graying of a '60s Dream, L.A.
TIMES, July 3, 1994, at M5 ("In the economic decline of the 1990s, blue-collar whites feel like
an endangered species and sullenly resent concessions for minorities and women."); Lower the
Volume, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1994, at A47 ("People are angry-angry and scared.... The
influx of women and minorities as competitors in the work force has unsettled-and unem-
ployed-a lot of white males.").
A recent example of the fear of unearned preferential treatment is found in California's
Proposition 209, passed by voters in November 1996. Seeking to end affirmative action by the
state, Proposition 209 provides that "[tihe state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferen-
tial treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31. The Ninth Circuit has held Proposition 209 to be constitutional. Coalition
for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1448 (9th Cir. 1997). Cathleen Decker notes that
much of the increasing concern about affirmative action can be linked to economic worry and
feelings of economic vulnerability. See Decker, supra note 2.
4. The fear of being taken as extremist leads many women, including working women, to
deny that they are feminists. See Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working
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greater than in the feminist community, where there are numerous over-
lapping, sometimes conflicting, theories and proposals. Second, issues
of gender equality in the workplace affect vastly more people than many
other legal issues. If I don't own any stock, I may not care about the
particulars of the securities laws. Similarly, if I'm not running a lending
institution, I likely will be uninterested in the priority rules for secured
creditors. In contrast, rules regarding gender and the workplace affect
both women and men, professionals and blue collar workers, employers
and existing and prospective employees, and family members who are de-
pendent, wholly or partially, on a worker's income.' In addition, the vast
variety of Workplaces, employers, and employees produces an infinite
number of factual variations. Each workplace presents a unique set of
Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1936 (1994) ("Many
working class women perceive the feminist movement as a white middle class women's move-
ment, anti-working class and divisive of working class men and women, and particularly of
Black men and women."); Linda S. Greene, Feminism, Law, and Social Change: Some Reflec-
tions on Unrealized Possibilities, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1252, 1261 (1993) (observing that many
poor women and women of color may not regard themselves as "feminists" although they would
still like to improve their lives); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40
STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1205 (1988) (noting that "[m]any female entrants to male-dominated oc-
cupations have maintained a careful distance from the organized women's movement; any sup-
port for women's issues comes with a careful disclaimer: 'I'm not a feminist but ....");
Richard Morin & Sharon Warden, Americans Vent Anger at Affirmative Action, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 1995, at Al (reporting that two-thirds of women surveyed are opposed to affirmative
action); The Feminist Minority, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1994, at A12 (reporting that a Gallup
poll showed that "only one in three American women considers herself a feminist, 51% think
the women's movement hurts relations between the sexes, and 57% say feminist leaders do not
reflect the view of a majority of women"). See also Ann E. Freedman, Se Equality, Sex Dif-
ferences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 965 (1983) (observing that because "sex
differences have been built into people's sense of themselves and into their relations with others
...[r]eexamining sex differentiation throughout the society is ... extremely threatening to
most people").
Also adding to the complexity of these issues is the fact that it is often difficult to tell
whether, in the long run, a particular rule helps women or hurts them. See infra notes 92-99
and accompanying text.
5. For descriptions of various feminist theories, see Kathryn Abrams, Title VI and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479, 2479-83 (1994) [hereinafter Abrams, Title
VI]; Kathryn Abrams, Se Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 304, 307-14 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Se Wars]; Patricia A. Cain, Femi-
nism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 827-41 (1990); Crain, supra note 4, at
1925-36; Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254 (1992);
Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for our Judges, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1915 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 1181, 1184-92 (1994); William J. Turnier et al., Redistributive Justice and Cultural Femi-
nism, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1275, 1278-99 (1996). See also sources cited infra note 64
6. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1311, 1316 (1989) (noting that "if one spouse's income rises, the other spouse bene-
fits").
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circumstances and problems, problems that may vary from one depart-
ment to another. Moreover, employees vary not just in sex, but also in
employment rank, race, education, economic class, age, temperament,
and background. As a result, the discrimination and harassment problems
faced by one employee at one workplace may be vastly different from
those encountered by another employee at another firm.
While the complexity of the issues makes finding concrete plans of
action difficult, both scholars and lay people increasingly agree on one
matter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,7 with its one-size-fits-all rules,
has not cured the problem of gender inequality in the workplace. Jobs
continue to be highly segregated by gender, and harassment remains a se-
rious problem.8
Even more fundamentally, there is no agreement on the underlying
premises of Title VII: that gender equality in employment is a worth-
while and achievable goal. After two decades with Title VII, a fair num-
ber of people remain unconvinced that sexual equality in employment can
ever be successfully achieved through law. Some contend that govern-
ment interference in private employment matters is doomed to failure and
that Title VII should be repealed insofar as it applies to sex.9 At the other
end of the spectrum are those commentators who argue that society needs
more government action, that, by itself, Title VII can never solve the
problem of sexual in-equality in the workplace. They seek legislation or
other action to change underlying structures in society and the work-
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII prohibits an "employer," defined as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees... and any
agent of such a person," from discriminating in "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
at §§ 2000e(b) and 2000e-2(a).
8. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production Sideshow: Why the Antidiscrimi-
nation Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1995) (arguing that all civil
rights laws regulating private employment should be repealed); Posner, supra note 6, at 1321-24
(predicting that sex discrimination will decline without need for federal laws); Jennifer Roback,
Beyond Equality, 82 GEO. L.J. 121, 132 (1993) (contending that "the pursuit of equality of in-
comes is a flawed social goal"). See also infra text accompanying notes 77-81.
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place." In between are those scholars who believe Title VII is a largely
adequate solution but needs modification to be more effective."1
Moreover, even among those people who believe sexual equality is a
goal worth pursuing, there is little agreement or discussion-beyond sug-
gestions for changing Title VII's elements or burdens of proof-regarding
how to make concrete progress on the issues. Instead, scholars frequently
debate such theoretical matters as whether there is an "essential"
woman," whether women speak with a distinct female voice,13 and
10. See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987) (arguing
that sex equality cannot be achieved through enforcement of antidiscrimination laws); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Households At Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82
GEo. L.J. 89, 98-102 (1993) (arguing that Title VII cannot reach the structural problems that
women face); Williams, supra note 1, at 835 (arguing that there need to be structural changes in
the workplace to accommodate women).
11. See authorities cited infra notes 71-76. See also Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at
2535-38 (arguing for increased enforcement of Title VII); Hadfield, supra note 3, at 1157 (sug-
gesting a new test for sexual harassment under Title VII); Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely,
Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceil-
ing?, 31 HoUs. L. REv. 1517, 1528-46 (1995) (describing four flaws in the current application
of Title VII); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of
Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1990) (arguing that courts should treat sexual stereotyping as
discriminatory per se); Rhode, supra note 5, at 1193-95, 1202 (asserting that Title VII focuses
too much on the employer's intent and that the law also suffers by leaving untouched an em-
ployer's inaction); Mark Seidenfeld, Some Jurisprudential Perspectives on Employment Sex Dis-
crimination Law and Comparable Worth, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 269 (1990) (advocating use of a
comparable worth approach).
12. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 3, 76 (1988) (arguing that many feminist theorists, con-
sciously or unconsciously, have assumed an essential woman who is white and middle-class);
Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2485 (summarizing anti-essentialist critiques in feminist the-
ory); Cain, supra note 5, at 838-41 (noting that post-modem feminists reject the notion of an
"essential woman"); Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate but Equal, or Anti-Subordination?
The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson For Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1089, 1092-1103 (1996) (giving examples of judicial decisions reflecting sexual essen-
tialism); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rnv.
581, 590-615 (1990) (arguing that experiences of black women show there is no "essential
woman"); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 481-85 (suggesting
that their are some characteristics that are basic to most women); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic
Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
1171, 1182-88 (1992) (describing debate); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (suggesting there is a "true nature" of women).
A related debate focuses on whether some women may have a "false consciousness" in the
sense of identifying with their oppressors, internalizing their views, and appearing content with
their own subordination. See MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 137; Kathryn Abrams, Ideology
and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REv. 761, 761 (1990); Delgado, supra note 3, at 653; Marl J.




whether women are better off stressing their similarities to or their differ-
ences from men. 14 Largely absent is any proposal for translating theory
into concrete advances in the workplace.' 5
In this Article, I argue that Title VII's failure to produce more con-
crete advances or even agreement about whether gender equality is desir-
able is due, in large part, to the vertical nature of the statute, in both its
development and testing. Title VII was vertically developed in that when
Congress added sex in Title VII, Congress was acting in a top-down
fashion, without seeking input from those who would be subject to its
rules. 6 Exacerbating the developmental flaws is the fact that Title VII is
also tested in a largely vertical way. Although the federal circuit and dis-
trict courts can and do consider each other's decisions, the ultimate inter-
preter of Title VII is the Supreme Court. As the sole court on its level,
the Supreme Court functions vertically in that it alone ultimately decides
each issue of statutory interpretation. 7
13. Compare CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1-4 (1982) (arguing that women have a different voice and ethic than
men), Freedman, supra note 4, at 965-66 (suggesting that women have distinct perspectives),
Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1319-20, 1331
(1987) (suggesting there is a female voice), Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New
Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 44-46
(1987) (asserting that women lawyers deal with disputes differentlythan men), Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580-
613 (1986) (predicting that feminine perspective in judiciary will change constitutional interpre-
tations), and West, supra note 12, at 13-42 (arguing that women have a different moral voice
than men), with Sandra D. O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1546, 1557
(1991) (stating that to ask "whether women attorneys speak with a 'different voice' than men is
a question that is both dangerous and unanswerable"), Rhode, supra note 5, at 1190 (contending
that discussions of a woman's "different voice" offer a simplified view of women), Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination,
70 TEx. L. REV. 109, 140-47 (1991) (criticizing different-voice feminism), and Williams, su-
pra note 1, at 802-21 (criticizing different-voice theory). See also McClain, supra note 12, at
1188-1203 (describing debate).
14. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
15. See Bartlett, supra note 3, at 325 (noting that there is a significant gap between insight
and practice); Becker, supra note 3, at 990 (observing that we do not know what equality be-
tween the sexes might look like or how to get there); Delgado, supra note 3, at 658 ("You need
more than theory to explain what's wrong; you also need to explain what we ought to be do-
ing."); Epstein, supra note 9, at 1085-86 (noting that there's strong disagreement about whether
and how to pursue affirmative action); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Re-
construction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 751 (1994) (discussing the disagreement among feminists
about strategy and tactics); Margaret J. Radin, Affirmative Action Rhetoric, in REASSESSING
CIVIL RIGHTS 131-49 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1991) (observing the difficulty in moving from
goal of equality in employment to practical problem of making progress on issue).
16. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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Superficially such vertical movement seems natural and proper with
respect to important social, if not moral, issues.18 We tend to see prog-
ress as putting one step in front of the other, as forward movement.
Furthermore, civil libertarians have long viewed the federal government
as properly taking the lead in civil rights.19 All too often, when left to
themselves, private parties and states have proven slow to change. Thus,
some scholars regard any call to rely on state or local action as a coded
invitation to roll back the clock on civil rights."m Yet, given the inability
of Title VII to solve gender issues, the time has come to look beyond the
borders of employment law and to consider the jurisprudential approach
of other legal disciplines. In particular, Title VII's vertical jurisprudence
needs to be supplemented with a horizontal approach to rulemaking and
rule-testing.2'
By horizontal rulemaking, I mean the involvement of many voices,
whether in the form of drafting committees or courts, in the creation of
standards. It is bottom-up in structure, with those who will be subject to
the rules participating in the drafting stage. By horizontal rule-testing, I
mean the interpretation of rules by numerous, equally sovereign tribunals,
who build upon and learn from one another's successes and failures.
With both rule-development and rule-testing, a horizontal approach typi-
cally begins with different, conflicting ideas, and then, through a cross-
fertilization process, a gradual movement toward the better-working
18. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
19. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1130, 1231-33 (1986) (arguing that state courts tend to be less receptive to federal constitutional
claims than federal courts); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1121-
22 (1977) (arguing that federal judges are better interpreters of federal constitutional rights than
state judges).
20. Erwin Chemerinsky has been quoted as saying:
States' rights arguments have been used throughout American history as a guise by
conservatives to achieve their objectives in a rhetorically appealing manner. They
used it in the 1830s as a justification for slavery, in the 1860s to argue against Recon-
struction, in the early part of this century to argue against national labor standards, in
the middle of the century to defend racial segregation, and now, late in this century,
are using it to eliminate federal programs and policies with which they disagree.
Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 76, 81 (quoting Erwin
Chemerinsky).
21. I limit my discussion in this Article to sex discrimination for the simple reason that
women, although they differ in their views, comprise over 50% of the population. While not all
adult women work outside the home, sex discrimination in employment will still affect most of
them. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. I leave for another day the question of whether
a horizontal strategy would be helpful in dealing with issues of race, ethnicity, or age discrimi-
nation, i.e., issues in which a smaller group is seeking change.
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strategies. Philosophically, it is Hegelian in structure, with a clash of
ideas and approaches on the beginning, lower level leading to a synthesis
that embodies a consensual and superior result.2 That result, in turn, is
tested and questioned, and over time modified as more ideas emerge,
situations change, or experiments are tried.
In law, examples of horizontal jurisprudence can be found in the
Uniform Commercial Code, state common and statutory law, and negoti-
ated agency regulations. Each of these is instructive in demonstrating
somewhat different aspects of a horizontal approach to law development
or testing. Taken together, they show the concrete benefits a horizontal
jurisprudence offers.
At first blush, gender issues in the workplace seem light years apart
from the UCC, state common and statutory law, and administrative regu-
lations. In some respects, they are. Yet the very attributes that make
employment issues so intractable-the multitude of potential solutions and
the effect of the issues on so many people in so many different settings-
make a horizontal approach particularly suitable. This is not to say that
the UCC, the common law, or the experiences of administrative agencies
can or should be transplanted wholesale into the area of employment law.
Most particularly, I am not recommending abandoning Title VII or en-
acting a uniform state law of employment discrimination. Nor am I ad-
vancing a political argument for states' rights.
What I advocate is supplementing-not supplanting-Title VII with a
horizontal approach. Unlike the UCC and administrative experiences, the
adoption of a horizontal approach to employment issues will result in less
centralized, less uniform strategies for resolving gender issues in the
workplace. It will encourage different employers and employees to de-
velop and try different strategies to deal with the specific problems they
face at their workplace. Some strategies will succeed, others will fail.
Still others will change over time. Gradually firms and employees can
learn from one another's successes and failures and move toward real
progress on these complex issues.
Adding a horizontal approach to employment issues will also allow
for preventive action, something that Title VII largely ignores. While an
employer may set up management training programs to avoid Title VII
liability, the federal law is basically reactive in providing an aggrieved
•22. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE MIND 179-213 (J.B. Baillie trans., Harper
& Rowe 1967) (1807).
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worker a right to litigate after a dispute arises.' In contrast, a horizontal
approach encourages proactive dialogue aimed at dispute avoidance.
Furthermore, rather than a litigation format pitting an individual employee
against an employer, a horizontal approach encourages group work and
an airing of a variety of views, a strategy that will benefit both employees
and employers.24 A horizontal approach is also fully consistent with much
current feminist theory in that it is an inclusive, bottom-up style of prob-
lem solving that focuses on specific situations?25
Part I of this Article gives a brief overview and examples of vertical
and horizontal jurisprudence. Part II describes the largely vertical devel-
opment and testing of Title VII, and outlines the confused case law and
theoretical disputes spawned by this vertical jurisprudence. Part III de-
scribes three examples of horizontal jurisprudence: the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, state common and statutory law, and negotiated adminis-
trative regulations. While each of these legal areas has different strengths
and weaknesses, together they demonstrate the key aspects of a horizontal
approach. Finally, Part IV shows how specific aspects of a horizontal ju-
risprudence can be applied to issues of gender equality in the workplace
in order to make concrete progress on these issues.
I. Horizontal Versus Vertical Legal Development
In the simplest sense, there are two extremes for effecting legal
change: the vertical, monarchy approach and the horizontal, town-
meeting approach? 6 These two styles affect both the development and
testing of rules.
In a purely vertical system, rule-development is strictly a top-down
enterprise. The vertical lawmaker may be the wise platonic philosopher
23. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
26. In a recent article Professor Cooter refers to vertical lawmaking as centralized and
horizontal as decentralized. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:
The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643,
1644-45 (1996). Current business management literature also acknowledges and discusses the
difference between horizontal and vertical decision-making. See generally Bahman Bahrami,
Productivity Improvement Through Cooperation of Employer and Employees, 39 LAB. L.J. 167
(1988); Ram Charan, How Networks Reshape Organizations-for Results, HARV. BUS. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 104; Sumantra Ghoshal & Christopher Bartlett, Changing the Role of Top
Management: Beyond Structure to Processes, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 86; John
A. Byrne, The Horizontal Corporation: It's About Managing Across, Not Up and Down, Bus.
WK., Dec. 20, 1993, at 76.
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king or the irrational tyrannizing despot.' In either case, the lawmaker
issues rules without the prior advice or consent of her subjects, limited
only by the monarch's desire to avoid overthrow or beheading.2 In addi-
tion, the purely vertical lawmaker is also free to act without considering
what other lawmakers, be they monarchs or democracies, have done in
similar situations. Unfettered by either advice from her subjects or the
views of other rule makers, the vertical lawmaker has complete freedom
to create whatever rule she wants for a given problem.'
The monarch is also a prime example of a vertical rule-tester in that
the monarch is the final arbiter of questions regarding the scope, inter-
pretation, and application of any given law. As in her establishment of
rules, the monarch issues such legal interpretations without any need to
consider what other tribunals in other jurisdictions are doing with similar
issues.
At the other jurisprudential extreme is the purely horizontal approach
to law development and testing. With respect to the development of
rules, the horizontal approach differs in two key respects from the verti-
cal. First, with horizontal rulemaking, ideas percolate up from the bot-
tom, with the governed having a significant voice in the development of
rules.30 The most obvious example is a town meeting,31 where an issue is
thoroughly aired, each person is given an opportunity to be heard, and the
participants are equal in voting status.32  Second, in horizontal rulemak-
27. See Cooter, supra note 26, at 1644 (suggesting that, in modem times, only communist
dictatorships practiced central, vertical planning as a total system).
28. See id. at 1645 (noting that in a vertical, centralized system, "[i]nformation and moti-
vation move along a one-way street from top to bottom").
29. In corporate management, a vertical structure has been described as one where the
CEO sits "atop the hierarchy" and "looks down on order, symmetry, and uniformity," while the
"front-line managers look up at a phalanx of controllers whose demands soak up most of their
energy and time." Ghoshal & Bartlett, supra note 26, at 87. See also Byrne, supra note 26
(describing a vertical corporate structure as one in which "[t]he critical decision-making power
resides at the top").
30. See Andrew F. Popper, An Administrative Law Perspective on Consensual Decision-
making, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. 255, 256 (1983) ("At a base level, a consensual system involves
decisionmaking by those most affected by the outcome or result of the matter at hand .... .").
31. Historically, the town meeting, with decisions made by the citizens themselves, as op-
posed to their representatives, was the ideal of the antifederalists. The federalists, on the other
hand, saw the key to good government to be getting good representatives for the people and then
keeping these representatives "above the fray" and removed from citizen pressures. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 35-45 (1985).
32. For descriptions of the procedures used in typical town meetings, see CLARENCE M.
WEBSTER, TOWN MEETING COUNTRY 48-49, 228-35 (1945); James K. Hosmer, Samuel Adams,
Man of the Town-Meeting, in JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE 10, 56-59 (Herbert B. Adams ed., 1884). The town meeting worked best
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big, often there are multiple, equally sovereign rule makers that not only
experiment with various approaches to a problem but also endeavor to
learn from and build upon the experiences of others. For instance, going
back to the town-meeting example, while each town is free to make its
own rules, each is also likely to seek to learn about the successes and fail-
ures of other towns. Thus, a horizontal approach typically involves a
cross-fertilization of ideas and strategies. As different plans are tried,
discarded, or improved upon, better solution(s) gradually emerge.33
Thereafter, these "solutions" are tested, critiqued, and modified as yet
more ideas emerge.
Just as rules can be developed horizontally, so too can there be hori-
zontal rule-testing. This occurs in its purest form when there are differ-
ent, sovereign tribunals that have an opportinity to review a given issue
and these tribunals actively seek to learn from the approaches taken in
other jurisdictions. In ruling on any given legal question, each tribunal is
free to adopt, modify, or flatly reject the solutions of other tribunals. In
this way, horizontal rule-testing, like horizontal rule-development, en-
courages a cross-fertilization of ideas and an experimentation with various
approaches. Over time, a consensus is likely to form around better-
functioning approaches, which, in turn, will be subject to challenge, re-
examination, and change.
In short, in both rule-development and rule-testing, a horizontal ju-
risprudence is dialectic and Hegelian in nature.34 Ideas clash and merge,
and gradually better-working strategies emerge. These better-working
strategies are then themselves subject to critique and challenge and
changed as needed.
"in small places with relatively homogeneous populations." David B. Magleby, Let the Voters
Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. CoLO. L. REv. 13, 16
(1995). See also Popper, supra note 30, at 280-85 (describing different forms of consensual
decisionmaking).
33. In describing horizontal networks within corporations, Ram Charan states: "Over
time, the free flow of information allows networks to become self-correcting. New information
inspires debate, triggers action .... " Charan, supra note 26, at 114. See also Bahrami, supra
note 26, at 169 (observing that participatory management styles "are more adaptable to changing
objectives and environments than rigidly structured bureaucratic organizations"); Ghoshal &
Bartlett, supra note 26, at 89 (noting that in any horizontal management approach, "'[m]istakes
will be made, but if a person is essentially right, the mistakes he or she makes are not nearly as
serious in the long run as the mistakes management will make if it is dictatorial and undertakes
to tell those under its authority how they must do their jobs'" (quoting William L. McKnight,
former head of 3M)).
34. See HEGEL, supra note 22.
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In this country, most current public and private lawmaking schemes
fall somewhere between the purely vertical and purely horizontal mod-
els.35 In the private sector, a sole proprietor is a vertical rule developer,
limited only by laws and the need to compete for workers and custom-
ers.36  In the public arena, a Presidential executive order represents a
largely vertical rule-development. 37 The President who wishes to be ree-
lected will certainly consider the views of the electorate but is not re-
quired to follow the will of the majority in issuing such an order.3"
With respect to law-testing, the Supreme Court is probably the most
obvious example of a vertical tribunal in our government. (Some would
argue that the Court at times acts as a vertical law maker.)39 The justices,
unelected and with life tenure, are largely immune from citizen pressure.
They may bring their life experiences and common sense to bear on is-
35. See Cooter, supra note 26, at 1646 (stating that "[m]any scholars have detected a
movement in modern history from decentralized [horizontal] to centralized [vertical] law").
36. A slightly less vertical private rule maker is the board of directors of a large, publicly
held corporation. Board members consult with one another and then make decisions on behalf
of the corporation. Directors typically act with little direct input from shareholders but do so
with the knowledge that the shareholders can remove or not reelect them. See William T. Al-
len, The Evolution of Corporate Boards, 16 CORP. BOARD 1 (1995).
In theory, the board. . . , elected by the shareholders, has ultimate legal power to de-
ploy the assets of a corporation and direct its employees. However .... that theory
falls far short of explaining the reality. For a long time, boards were usually hand-
picked by the corporation's senior management and, except in a crisis, were largely
passive advisors to the CEO."
Id.
37. Congress describes Presidential executive orders as: "directives or actions by the
President... [which] may have the force and effect of law .... Executive orders are generally
directed to, and govern actions by, Government officials and agencies. They usually affect pri-
vate individuals only indirectly." HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957). See also DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1990) (noting that al-
though the executive order "is not authorized [or] even acknowledged in the United States Con-
stitution" the practice of issuing such orders has "existed from the earliest days of the Republic
at the federal level"); Cooter, supra note 26, at 1645 (stating that "the paradigm for centralized
[vertical] lawmaking is a decree, in which government officials formulate the state's goal, em-
body the goal in a rule, and force people to conform to it").
38. Although the President does not have to determine the will of the majority of citizens
before issuing an executive order, he is not free to act arbitrarily. See Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (holding that the President's power to issue an executive order
"must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself") (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
39. See infra notes 41 & 68 and accompanying text. See also THOMAS R. MARSHALL,
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 137 (1989) (reporting, as a general matter, that
while a third of all Americans hold positive attitudes toward the Supreme Court, approximately
the same number view the Court unfavorably).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
sues, and, to varying degrees, they may consider the views of one an-
other, other courts, legislators, scholars, and the public.' However,
apart from the briefs and arguments of the individual parties, the justices
are largely insulated from lobbying by the groups likely to be affected by
a ruling.4 Furthermore, as the sole court on its level, the Supreme Court
40. In some areas the legal standard requires the Court to consider public standards. See
e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating that "an assessment of contemporary
[public] values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction" is relevant in determining
whether the punishment violates the Eighth Amendment); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (holding that material is obscene if "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work appeals to prurient interests and describes sexual con-
duct in a patently offensive way). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992) (stating, in ruling on legality of abortion restriction, that the Court must consider "the
fact that for two decades ... people have organized intimate relationships and made choices
that define their views of themselves and their place in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail"); MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 31-32, 36-
54 (describing instances in which the Supreme Court directly mentioned public opinion).
Some commentators contend that, by and large, Supreme Court rulings are reflective of the
prevailing societal view. See MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 78; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE 13 (1991); Becker, supra note 3, at 988 (suggesting that the justices' concern for
public opinion deters them from taking bold steps); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Law from
the Bottom Up, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 141, 165-66 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court is very
interested in how its decisions will be received by society and that the inconsistency in Supreme
Court decisions is reflective of changes in public opinion); Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional
Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339, 340 (1987) (contending that all courts,
including the Supreme Court, follow public moods, although sometimes with delays). Undoubt-
edly there is a good deal of truth in this view. The justices are part of society and inevitably are
influenced by it. Moreover, they have a vested interest in having the public respect the Court as
an institution, something that will obviously occur more often when Court decisions are in line
with overall public opinion. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court will inevitably be an imperfect
mirror of societal views. It has only nine members, most of whom are white, older males who
come from the upper or middle classes. Moreover, their contact with the public is extremely
limited.
41. Justice Antonin Scalia was recently quoted as saying: "I don't know what the most
profoundly held beliefs of the American people are. I don't go to the neighborhood pub and
raise a glass with Joe Six-pack." A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 16. See also Graham v. Collins,
506 U.S. 461, 482 n.4 (1993) ("'[L]awyers attempting to thrust egalitarian or humanitarian re-
forms on a reluctant society prefer to use the courts because lifetime-appointed federal judges
are somewhat more insulated from the ebb and flow of political power and public opinion than
legislators or executives.'") (Thomas, J., concurring, quoting MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973)); Payne v. Tennes-
see, 501 U.S. 808, 868 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court ought not consider public opin-
ion in making its decisions) (Stevens, J., dissenting); MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 19 ("IT]he
Supreme Court is quite insulated from mass public opinion; justices sit for life ... and revers-
ing Court decisions is seldom simple."); Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section
1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. Rsv. 51, 83 (1989) (arguing that
Supreme Court justices often have a distorted view of the "real world"); Raoul Berger, Law-
rence Church on the Scope of Judicial Review and the Original Intention, 70 N.C. L. REv. 113,
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is free to issue legal interpretations with no horizontal, cross-fertilization
from other tribunals.
On the other hand, examples of horizontal rule-development and
testing are also found in the public and private sectors. In the private
sector, companies can, and have incentive to, engage in horizontal rule-
development by allowing workers to be included in making decisions.42
Or, horizontal development may occur among firms within an industry.
For instance, one company may implement a new program and, if it suc-
ceeds, other firms may copy or enlarge upon it. Thus, some U.S. auto-
mobile manufacturers have experimented with the Japanese group ap-
proach to car assembly.43 Similarly, some airlines are mimicking
128-29 (1991) ("[Ihe [Supreme Court] Justices are cloistered in an ivory tower, insulated from
the affairs of men.").
42. Analysts of management styles have noted the advantages of a horizontal, bottom-up
structure in business. See Bahrami, supra note 26, at 169 (noting that allowing employees to
have "a meaningful voice in the decisionmaking process not only leads to more accuracy in the
work process, selection of better alternatives, and more willingness to change, but also gives a
sense of belonging, achievement, growth, and recognition that is necessary for satisfaction, mo-
tivation, commitment, and higher long-term productivity improvement"); Mark Barenberg, The
Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV.
L. REv. 1379, 1493 (1993) ("[S]tudies confirm that an increased workers' role in workplace
decisionmaking tends to enhance workers' sense of responsibility and commitment to the deci-
sions they help make and to enterprise goals more generally . . . . ")(citation omitted); Byrue,
supra note 26 (observing that a horizontal structure can avoid costly delays from disagreements
and misunderstandings); Ghoshal & Bartlett, supra note 26, at 89, 93 (arguing that horizontal
organizational structures, in which employees have input, are more efficient and responsive to
market changes than vertical structures); Dorothy Leonard-Barton et al., How to Integrate Work
and Deepen Expertise, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 121, 125 (noting that a horizontal
management style empowers employees and "engenders a tremendous sense of project owner-
ship and spurs team members to make remarkable achievements"); Dallas Gatewood, Working
Managers Take in the View from Below, NEWSDAY, Mar. 12, 1995, at 5 (describing movement
toward peer and subordinate reviews of management); Wolfgang Muchau, People: Renschler
Cuts Loose, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at 11 (describing change in management style at Mer-
cedes-Benz US from a top-down hierarchy to a horizontal organization structure); Kevin G.
Salwen, Reich, Ivy League Thinker, Tries to Sell Ideas on Labor to Washington, WALL ST. J.,
May 5, 1993, at A24 (reporting that many management experts recommend that workers be part
of decisionmaking and assembled into horizontal teams); Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Role Model,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 1996, at R22 (stating that, within franchises, "'[h]ugely successful prod-
uct ideas tend to come from the franchisees, rather than down from the top of the chains ...
The reason is simple: Franchisees ... are much closer to the consumer pulse than are most
officials at chains' headquarters.'" (quoting Andrew C. Selden, a franchising lawyer, and
Dennis W. Hitzeman, a franchisee)). See also Cooter, supra note 26, at 1646 (arguing that a
decentralized, horizontal approach is important for efficiency as economies and technologies
become more advanced and complex).
43. See David J. Woolf, Note, The Legality of Employee Participation in Unionized Firms:
The Saturn Experience and Beyond, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 557, 602 (1994) (noting a
need for U.S. automakers to be aware of Japanese management methods); Joseph B. White et
al., Long Road Ahead: American Auto Makers Need Major Overhaul to Match the Japanese,
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Southwest Airline's discount approach.' In the public sector, federal and
state legislatures act as horizontal lawmakers to the extent the legislators
are subject to constituent pressure, permit interested parties to be heard on
issues,45 debate issues, and share insights.'
As will be discussed more fully in Part Im, a horizontal testing of
laws occurs among the state courts as each develops its common law.47 In
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1992, at Al (describing U.S. auto makers' adoption of Japanese product-
development methods that are horizontal in nature).
44. See Stanley Ziemba, Nimble Discount Airline Outpacing Wannabes, CHI. TRIB., July
3, 1995, at 1B (describing airlines that are imitating Southwest).
45. With respect to state legislatures, see infra Part III.B. The extent to which elected rep-
resentatives actually respond to constituent pressure is debatable. Compare Becker, supra note
3, at 989 (observing that although legislators are mostly male, they are subject to direct pressure
from female constituents), Eskridge, supra note 40, at 169-79 (arguing that, as a descriptive
proposition, U.S. political bodies are responsive to societal pressures), and Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 900, 906 (1987)
(asserting that the influence of special interest groups has been overstated); with W. Lawrence
Church, History and the Constitutional Role of Courts, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 1071, 1093 (noting
that members of Congress "seem to be achieving [a] sort of lifetime tenure" and "appear to be
becoming less accountable to the voters," as well as being "practically immune to challenge"),
Cooter, supra note 26, at 1644-45 (characterizing the U.S. environmental laws as examples of
centralized, vertical lawmaking in that federal officials impose a system of quotas on business in
a top-down fashion), and Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective
on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-83 (1988)
(describing the influence of special interest groups on Congress). See also Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 229-33 (1986) (describing interest group theory of legisla-
tion); Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private Law Area, 79
MINN. L. REv. 861, 864 (1995) ("The workings of Congress often produce an amalgamation of
independent provisions derived from proposals of various groups, rather than synthesized legis-
lation that is compatible with other laws or circumstances.").
46. A more cynical view of the likelihood of shared insights in Congress is given by Wil-
liam D. Warren, who describes a typical federal congressional hearing: "[R]epresentatives of
interest groups making speeches to [a] subcommittee, whose members might or might not [be] in
attendance. Roles [are] played; voices [are] raised. But no one... listen[s] because everyone
[understands] that the real work [is] ... done in private." William D. Warren, UCC Drafting:
Method and Message, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 811, 815 (1993). Fred Miller similarly states:
"Most legislatures, including Congress, are politically focused, reactive groups .... [M]ost
legislators rarely formulate, draft, or extensively study the legislation themselves .... Most
would... agree that when congressional staff drafts legislation largely on its own or pursuant
to inadequate advice, the result is a technical nightmare . . . ." Miller, supra note 45, at 863-
64. See also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845, 858-59 (1992) (noting that legislators inevitably depend on staff members to
review proposed legislation and read committee reports); Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC Proc-
ess-Consensus and Balance, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 287, 304-06 (1994) (observing that often
Congress does not act until a crisis arises, legislative drafting is done by inexperienced staff
members, laws are shaped by special interest groups, the hearing process is used for making
statements rather than for sorting out facts, and the congressional process can be slow and result
in stalemate).
47. See infra Part Ill.B.
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issuing such decisions, the judiciary of each state is free to consider, and
then accept or reject, rulings from courts in other states on similar issues.
For instance, state judiciaries have looked to and built upon the rulings of
other state courts in areas as diverse as tort liability, fiduciary duty, and
choice of law doctrine.48
II. Title VII: A Study in Vertical Jurisprudence
Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination in employment is a
prime example of vertical jurisprudence. This provision had virtually no
horizontal development and receives only limited horizontal testing.
With respect to law development, the inclusion of sex in Title VII
came about as "something of an accident" 49 with Congress adding sex to
the Title VII bill at the last moment. Moreover, Congress did so without
the benefit of hearings, studies of current business practices, testimony,
or prior legislation.50  Neither business leaders nor labor representatives
presented evidence or even opinions on the issue. Thus, Title VII's ap-
plication to sex discrimination was not a synthesis of or a considered de-
velopment from current business practices. Instead, the inclusion of sex
in Title VII was an almost completely vertical act by Congress and came
like the proverbial bolt from the blue.5' Indeed, there is substantial evi-
48. See, e.g., Herbert v. Saffell, 877 F.2d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 1989) (looking to the com-
mon law of other states to determine a realtor's duty to buyers in Maryland); Davis v. United
States, 716 F.2d 418, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1983) (looking to the law of other states to construe an
Illinois statute's reference to "willful and malicious" acts). But see generally Michael H. Got-
tesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1991) (arguing there is too much disparity among the choice of law theories of the vari-
ous states). See also infra Part III.B.
49. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 816 (1991).
50. See John J. Donohue, III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1989). Congress also had little in the way
of state laws to use as guidance in this area. As of 1964, 28 states had antidiscrimination laws,
but only two states' laws prohibited sex discrimination. See 110 CONG. REC. 7214 (1964); Jo
Freeman, How Sex Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9
LAW & INEQ. J. 163, 163 (1991). See also Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States:
Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in Law of the American Workplace, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 469, 496-503 (1993) (discussing state antidiscrimination laws); Susan M.
Mathews, Title VI1 and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 299, 302-04 (1991) (describing current state antidiscrimination laws, state worker
compensation laws, and state tort doctrine and concluding that none is an adequate remedy for
sexual harassment).
51. See Estrich, supra note 49, at 816. The first administrator of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission put it more bluntly and less politely when he said that the amendment
adding sex to Title VII was a "fluke" that was "conceived out of wedlock." ROSENBERG, supra
note 40, at 252 (quoting the first administrator). This is not to say that, in making Title VII
[Vol. 49HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
dence that the Congressman who added sex to the bill did so simply in the
hope that the inclusion would lead to the wholesale defeat of Title VII. 52
Not only was the inclusion of sex in Title VII made in a vertical, top-
down fashion, the testing of the law is also largely vertical in structure.
Title VII cases are brought predominantly in the federal courts, limiting
interpretation of the act to the district and circuit courts.53 While there is
certainly some cross-fertilization among the federal judges as they con-
sider case law from other circuits and districts, the relatively small num-
ber of federal circuits limits the amount of horizontal law-testing that is
possible. Additionally, the final arbiter of any Title VII issue is the Su-
preme Court, which, as discussed earlier, acts as an almost purely vertical
law-tester, having few contacts with the populace and no equally sover-
eign tribunals to which to look for ideas.' Instead, the view of any five
justices establishes the official interpretation of Title VII, an interpretation
that can be changed only by congressional action or another Supreme
Court decision.
The testing of Title VII is further limited by the overwhelming pre-
dominance of middle- to upper-class white men in the federal judiciary.55
applicable to gender, Congress was oblivious to societal trends, particularly the women's
movement. Obviously the women's movement and the entry of more women into the workplace
were critical to the inclusion of sex in Title VII. See Franke, supra note 1, at 15-24 (discussing
the history of the women's movement that influenced Congress); Freeman, supra note 50, at
172-79 (describing legislative lobbying by women's groups prior to Title VII's passage). All
laws, are, to a greater or lesser degree, reflective of societal view. However, the key words
are: "to a greater or lesser degree." The influence of society on Congress' inclusion of sex in
Title VII was on the "lesser" end of the spectrum.
52. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 278 (1992); ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 252; Becker, supra note 3,
at 1010; Estrich, supra note 49, at 816-17; Franke, supra note 1, at 14; Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1283-84 (1991). But see
Freeman, supra note 50, at 164 (expressing skepticism of this proposition).
53. Prior to 1990, most courts believed that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
Title VII cases. See Roy L. Brooks, A Roadmap Through Yitle VII's Procedural and Remedial
Labyrinth, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 511, 517 n.42 (1995) (discussing cases). However, in Yellow
Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990), the Supreme Court held that federal
courts share concurrent jurisdiction with state courts with respect to Title VII cases. See id. at
821. However, most plaintiffs continue to bring their Title VII suits in federal court. See
Neuborne, supra note 19, at 1125-30 (noting that plaintiffs believe that federal courts provide a
more hospitable forum for employment discrimination claims than do state administrative agen-
cies or courts). See also Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1568, 1575 (1996) [hereinafter Developments] ("The federal courts, in particular, have
assumed a greater role than the EEOC in shaping employment discrimination policy.").
54. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
55. See ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 219 n.33 (reporting that "by the 1980s, women
comprised less than 8 percent of both the federal and state judiciaries"); Mary E. Becker, The
Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI.
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The result is that even if a federal judge does consider the case law from
other federal courts, the cross-fertilization is usually limited to one white,
middle-class male considering what another white, middle-class male has
to say on the matter. While male judges may have varying professional
backgrounds and political philosophies, one thing is certain: none has
been a woman in the workplace. 6
The result of Title VII's vertical jurisprudence is abundantly evident.
Among all groups-women and men, employers and employees, liberals
and conservatives, lawyers and lay people-there is a disappointment with
the law's handling of sex discrimination claims. 7 While there is no doubt
L. REV. 453, 455-56 (1992) (stating that, as of 1991, women comprised only seven percent of
federal district court judges and eight percent of federal appellate judges); Judith Resnik, "Natu-
rally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1682, 1690-93, 1705 (1991) (giving statistics on the number of female federal judges). With
respect to the Supreme Court, all but two of the justices have been male. For a description of
three early female federal judges, see generally Ruth B. Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill, Women in
the Federal Judiciary: Three Way Pavers and the Exhilarating Change President Carter
Wrought, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 281 (1995).
56. See ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 219-22 (noting that "[t]here is a great deal of evi-
dence that the courts, composed overwhelmingly of men, have had great difficulty taking sex
discrimination claims seriously" and giving examples of modem instances of sex bias in court
opinions) (footnote omitted); Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Rea-
sonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1021, 1033 (1992) (ob-
serving that, because most are white males, judges inevitably have trouble determining how a
"reasonable woman" would assess a situation); Becker, supra note 3, at 988 (stating that male
judges inevitably look at the world from a male viewpoint and with greater awareness of the
needs of men rather than women); Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 148 (discussing the problem that courts have
dealing with claims of black women); Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the
Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1062 (1996) (stating that "[c]ourts have
developed an ideological framework that draws upon and perpetuates traditional gender role
stereotypes); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 45-46
(1987) (noting that no judge can be impartial in the sense of being unaffected by one's own per-
spectives and experiences); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Chal-
lenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1769 (1991) (reporting that often courts look
for a simple causal explanation for a complex employment pattern and use broad generalizations
to characterize all women). See also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1991) (discussing the difficulty
courts have in understanding battered-women cases).
57. The disappointment with Title VII comes from both the critics and the supporters of
the law. On one side, Richard Epstein, who advocates repealing Title VII with respect to sex,
dismisses the federal employment laws as examples of a "fatal conceit" of those who believe an
economy can be managed from the center. See Richard A. Epstein, The Authoritarian Impulse
in Sex Discrimination Law: A Reply to Professors Abrams and Strauss, 41 DEPAUL L. REV.
1041, 1054-55 (1992). See also Epstein, supra note 9, at 1085-86 (noting that there is strong
disagreement about whether and how to pursue affirmative action). On the other hand, propo-
nents of Title VII also admit it has fallen far short of producing gender equality in employment.
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that the inclusion of sex in Title VII has benefited women (and some
men),58 no one is fully satisfied with the results. As a statistical matter,
there is no question that the law has failed to bring about gender equality
or to eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace. 9 Studies show that
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2541, 2542 (1994) (stating that
despite the progress made under Title VII, the Civil Rights Act has never kept up with the ex-
pectations of scholars and has proven an inadequate tool to address certain issues); Franke, supra
note 1, at 87 (asserting that "the cutting edge of the Title VII blade has shown itself to be
something less than razor-sharp in eradicating workplace sex discrimination"); Paetzold & Gely,
supra note 11, at 1548-49 (observing that Title VII has not been successful in eliminating sex
discrimination in promotions).
58. Supporters of Title VII cite a number of beneficial results of the federal law, including:
lowering entry barriers to certain jobs, see Paetzold & Gely, supra note 11, at 1526-27; estab-
lishing a nationally uniform set of rules, see Donohue, supra note 50, at 1347 (arguing that, by
applying to all companies, Title VII precludes free-riding by one firm on advances made by an-
other); Drummonds, supra note 50, at 524-25 (noting that, in treating all employers alike, the
uniform requirements of Title VII have a fairness component and also prevent states from trying
to attract business by having different rules); hastening firms to take steps that, in the long run,
would come about through market forces, see Donohue, supra note 50, at 1348; increasing
women's self esteem, see id. at 1349-51, 1354 (predicting that Title VII may increase self-
esteem among working women, thereby increasing market efficiency, and may additionally in-
crease self-esteem of women outside the paid workforce); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Prin-
ciple, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 2410, 2418, 2430 (1994) (stating that discrimination may lead women
to invest less in education and training and to have less self-respect); encouraging women to
work together on various issues, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Poli-
tics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 613-29, 640-41
(1986) (arguing that legal advocacy can help women by airing problems, encouraging women to
mobilize, increasing self-esteem, and testing different theories). But see ROSENBERG, supra
note 40, at 341-42 (concluding that there is "no evidence that court decisions mobilize support-
ers of significant social reform" and may actually mobilize opponents); Becker, supra note 3, at
997 (suggesting that judicial decisions on matters like sexual equality can sap strength of
women's movement and mobilize opposition).
The strides women have made in employment during the last decades are not due solely to
Title VII; other contributing factors include birth control, economic conditions, and better edu-
cation. See Claire Etaugh, Women in the Middle and Later Years, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN
213, 230 (Margaret W. Matlin ed., 2d ed. 1993) (noting increased number of jobs available,
rising divorce rate, lessened household demands, and fewer children); Greene, supra note 4, at
1263 (observing that there have been changes in the social matrix, such as birth control, univer-
sal education, and expansion of the work force); Posner, supra note 6, at 1321-24 (noting that
because the number of women in the workplace was increasing before the passage of civil rights
laws, it is difficult to assess the impact of sex discrimination laws).
59. See MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 1285 (contending that the law has not proven par-
ticularly helpful to women). See also Sunstein, supra note 58, at 2426.
[I]t is not clear how much difference the law has made. The relative labor-market
status of women has not changed much in the aftermath of judicial decisions. The dif-
ference between the earnings of women and of men was greater in 1980 than it was in
1955.... Women continue to face occupational segregation in the workforce, and
the result is that women disproportionately occupy low-paying positions traditionally
identified as female.
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many jobs continue to be segregated along gender lines, that even in those
areas in which women and men hold similar jobs, women often receive
lower pay and fewer promotions," and that sexual harassment remains
prevalent.6' While some people conclude from this that there needs to be
more Title VII enforcement (and perhaps additional legislation), other
people, including some women, feel the entire "women's movement" has
been a misguided failure that has excluded mainstream women and their
everyday concerns. 62 Other women feel the law has minimized the em-
Id.
60. The statistics are collected in ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 207-11; Crain, supra note
4, at 1913-14; Etaugh, supra note 58, at 231-32; Franke, supra note 1, at 87-88; Green &
Russo, supra note 3, at 687-93; Sharon M. Oster, Is There a Policy Problem?: The Gender
Wage Gap, 82 GEo. L.J. 109, 110 (1993); Paetzold & Gely, supra note 11, at 1519; Deborah
L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207, 1208-10. Rhode concludes that, at
the current rate, it will take 75-100 years to arrive at a sex-balanced workplace. See id. at 1210.
See also Cynthia F. Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in
the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 317-30 (1995) (giving statistics for women in
law firms); Jane Friesen, Alternative Economic Perspectives on the Use of Labor Market Poli-
cies to Redress the Gender Gap in Compensation, 82 GEo. L.J. 31, 33-52 (1993) (discussing
explanations for wage gap); Hadfield, supra note 10, at 91-95 (explaining theories of why
women earn less than men); George Rutherglen, The Theory of Comparable Worth as a Remedy
for Discrimination, 82 GEO. L.J. 135, 142 (1993) (noting that studies show that sex segregation
in employment is more widespread and severe than racial discrimination). But see Richard A.
Epstein, Some Reflections on the Gender Gap in Employment, 82 GEO. L.J. 75, 77-82 (1993)
(questioning some of Friesen's data and conclusions). With respect to the role of pregnancy in
creating and exacerbating the wage gap, see Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women
and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154,
2160-71 (1994).
61. See Beverly H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, An International Perspective on Sexual
Harassment Law, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 43, 44 (1993) (giving statistics on sexual harassment);
Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the
Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L. J. 399, 403-04 (1996) (noting
that sexual harassment has been called the most widespread problem faced by working women
and giving statistics); Estrich, supra note 49, at 821-22 (giving statistics on sexual harassment);
Hadfield, supra note 3, at 1171-72 (describing harm flowing from harassment and fear of har-
assment); Paul N. Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual
History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence
412, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1155, 1158 (1995) (observing that "research indicates that sexual har-
assment remains a vastly under reported form of employment discrimination despite the fact that
the incidence of sexual misconduct in the workplace is quite high"); Mary F. Radford, By Invi-
tation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499,
520 (1994) (giving statistics and noting that studies "make it difficult, if not impossible, to dis-
pute... [that] sexual harassment... is a widespread, costly problem" in the U.S. workplace);
Rhode, supra note 4, at 1195-96 (noting that sexual harassment remains pervasive).
62. Thus, some working women eschew the label "feminist." See supra note 4. Some
commentators cite as a weakness in the feminist movement its lack of attention to the problems
of women in lower economic classes. See Crain, supra note 4, at 1925-26; Kris Kissman,
Brushing Off the Blue Collar Woman? Has the Women's Movement Ignored the Needs of Work-
ing Women?, 15 HUMAN RTS. Q. 36, 39 (1987); Richard Epstein accuses radical feminists of
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ployment gains they have made. More than a few men feel threatened
that they have been or could be the victims of an employer who bends
over backwards to avoid a sex discrimination claim.6 Even among femi-
nists there are a myriad of different theories and approaches.' Emotions
run high, conversations quickly turn into angry exchanges, and all too
often, people simply avoid the topic altogether, much as they have been
taught to do with religion and politics at a social affair.
Even supporters of Title VII admit that the judicial application of the
law to sex-related claims has been woefully inadequate.' Courts appear
able to deal effectively with only the most blatant instances of sexual dis-
crimination or harassment.6 The more subtle cases have produced an ar-
ray of ambiguous standards and frequently inconsistent rulings.67 Moreo-
hubris in believing that they can transform the behavior and preferences of "ordinary men and
women." EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 271. Apparently, Epstein suffers from the hubris of be-
lieving that he knows who is an "ordinary" man or woman and what he or she prefers.
63. See sources cited supra note 3.
64. For authorities describing the various feminist theories, see supra note 5. See also
Becker, supra note 3, at 1011 ("There is no consensus of the meaning of sex discrimina-
tion .... Nor is there any consensus about what [a world with perfect sexual equality] would
look like or how to get there."); David Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing from
Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 79 n.82 (1985) ("The
term 'feminism' encompasses a wide range of political and personal stances."); Harris, supra
note 15, at 751 (noting that there is a disagreement among feminists about strategy and tactics);
Issacharoff & Rosenblum, sipra note 60, at 2178, 2192-99 (discussing division among feminists
with respect to issue of pregnancy and employment); Daniel R. Ortiz, Feminism and the Family,
18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 523 (1995) (noting that feminism "encompasses many
sometimes conflicting movements"); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Jurisprudence, 1
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5, 6-7 (1991) ("IThere are many different feminist perspectives.
Feminist theory is not unitary; there is no ... one politically correct feminist theory.").
65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Because the law defines "employer" as a
person who has "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more cal-
endar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year," a fair number of employers remain out-
side the reach of the law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b). See Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter.,
Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660, 661-662 (1996) (holding that "employee" includes all workers with whom
firm had employment relationship on day in question, regardless of whether employee worked or
was compensated on given day); Developments, supra note 53, at 1647-62 (discussing temporary
workers).
66. See Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2492-2526 (describing the difficulty courts have
in dealing with complex cases, such as discrimination against a subgroup of women or discrimi-
nation involving members of the same subgroup); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1202 (1989) (noting "diffi-
culties courts have in understanding how sexual harassment affects working women"); Karst,
supra note 12, at 465-67 (observing that, absent intentional exclusion of women from a position,
courts have difficulty dealing with sex discrimination cases); Rhode, supra note 4, at 1196 (as-
serting that the current federal laws miss all but the most egregious discrimination). With re-
spect to gender biases of judges, see sources cited supra note 56.
67. See Radford, supra note 11, at 502 (noting that there are a "myriad" of unanswered
questions in the area of sexual harassment in which lower courts have gone different ways); De-
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ver, given the absence of legislative history regarding Title VII's applica-
tion to sex, judicial decisions frequently smack of law-making with little
input from those subject to the resulting rules.68
Probably nowhere has Title VII spawned more confusion and debate
than in claims of sexual harassment. 69 Although the act itself says nothing
about sexual harassment, in 1986 the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII
prohibits sexual harassment as a form of discrimination.7' Rather than
clarifying matters, this and subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding
sexual harassment have led to a plethora of unanswered questions. These
questions include: the proper role and definition of consent (or, to use the
judicially created word, "welcomeness"); 71 the level of severity or perva-
velopments, supra note 53, at 1578-79 (arguing that "the Supreme Court's most recent attempt
to clarify [the procedural] area has done nothing but perpetuate and exacerbate the ideologically-
based circuit split," resulting in "ubiquitous confusion"). See also infra notes 71-76 and ac-
companying text.
68. See Estrich, supra note 49, at 817 (describing legislative background); Franke, supra
note 1, at 14-15 (noting that, given the lack of legislative history with respect to the inclusion of
sex in Title VII, "many judges faced with interpreting the meaning and scope of the sex dis-
crimination protections... believed they were writing on a blank slate"); Freedman, supra note
4, at 963-64 (arguing that, in dealing with issue of sexual equality, justices make normative-
based decisions that reflect their personal views). See also Developments, supra note 53, at
1574 (observing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII, "created almost as
many ambiguities as it clarified"). Title VII is certainly not the only area of the law in which
the Supreme Court has been accused of lawmaking. See Beermann, supra note 41, at 52-53 (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the 1871 civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), are really just the justices' personal views on the issues).
69. Various aspects of sexual harassment contribute to its confusing and complex nature.
See Estrich, supra note 49, at 819-22 (observing that our society is still permeated by a gender
double standard and that many people fear that small offenses will elicit lawsuits); Hadfield,
supra note 3, at 1151 (noting that inquiry into sexual harassment is "laden with subjective value
judgments" and that the individual harassment lawsuit often becomes "a microcosm for the
larger social debate about what behavior is acceptable in the workplace"); Radford, supra note
61, at 521 (noting that men and women have significantly different perceptions of sexual har-
assment).
70. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). The argument that
sexual harassment is a form of discrimination can be traced to CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). For a
discussion of why harassment should be considered a form of discrimination, see generally
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997).
71. The concepts of welcomeness and unwelcomeness were introduced into the sexual har-
assment lexicon in Meritor, where the Supreme Court said that the gravamen of the offense is
that the sexual advances were "unwelcome." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. Courts require that the
plaintiff prove unwelcomeness as part of her prima facie case. See Fuller v. City of Oakland,
47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assoc., 30 F.3d 1350, 1361 (7th
Cir. 1994). The decision on this issue is obviously factual and often has an "eye-of-the-
beholder" quality. See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. of Gen. Motors, 32 F.3d 1007,
1010-11 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court's finding of welcomeness based on plain-
tiff's crude behavior and language). Scholars have criticized the propriety of including unwel-
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siveness the plaintiff must show; 2 whether a reasonable person or even a
reasonable woman test is workable;73 the appropriateness of admitting
comeness as an element of the offense. See Estrich, supra note 49, at 826-30 (arguing that un-
welcomeness is an unnecessary element that improperly shifts the focus to the victim and penal-
izes both the quiet woman who does not loudly voice her displeasure "like a man" and the as-
sertive woman who may not be believed if she says she was offended by lewd behavior);
Franke, supra note 1, at 92-93 (noting that sexual harassment claims have been barred when the
woman working in a.male-dominated workplace acted like "one~of the boys"); Mathews, supra
note 50, at 314 (asserting that the element of consent leads to questions such as whether silence
may be construed as consent and whether some objections by a plaintiff can be disregarded be-
cause of her past conduct); Radford, supra note 61, at 513-20, 531-32 (collecting cases and
contending that the burden should be on the harasser to show affirmative evidence of welcome-
ness). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 354 (arguing that consent must be an element in a
sexual harassment case in order to distinguish consent from coercion).
72. In Menitor, the Supreme Court held that, to be actionable, the sexual harassment must
be sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the employment and create an abusive working con-
dition. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66. Accord Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993) ("[W'hether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking
at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance
[and]... [t]he effect on the employee's psychological well-being."). Here again, decisions are
highly fact-specific and vary with the eye of the beholding court. See, e.g., Farpella-Crosby v.
Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a supervisor's comments
were sufficient to support a finding of hostile environment); McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of
Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that three sexual comments over three
months did not constitute sexual harassment); Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 86 F.3d 167,
169 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding there was no showing of hostile environment where co-worker
kissed plaintiff, made inappropriate touches, lifted her by the waist, and pinned her against a
pool table); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
numerous sexual comments over seven months were not sufficient to show hostile environment);
Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a rumor that plaintiff was
having affair with her boss was sufficient to show hostile environment); Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to follow Seventh and Sixth Circuit decisions regarding
whether conduct was sufficiently severe to constitute hostile environment).
Like the unwelcomeness requirement, the pervasiveness inquiry has also come under criti-
cism from scholars. For instance, Susan Estrich argues that the pervasiveness requirement was
added out of a fear of too many lawsuits and that it is unfair to women because it allows behav-
ior to escape liability if the employer can show it is widespread in society. See Estrich, supra
note 49, at 833-45. Furthermore, in judging what is tolerable in "society at large," the court
looks at a society that has been shaped by men. See id. In addition, Estrich notes that, in the
hostile environment case, the requirement that the pervasive and hostile nature of the workplace
be shown objectively, i.e., with respect to all women at the workplace, is at odds with the un-
welcomeness requirement, which focuses on the particular complaining woman and that even if
a workplace is objectively hostile, an employer can escape liability by arguing that the particular
complaining woman welcomed it. See id. See also Abrams, supra note 66, at 1202-07 (noting
that because men control the workplace, their view of sexual harassment is typically considered
"normal," even though the man's view may be different from the woman's); Bernstein, supra
note 2, at 1259 (observing that the U.S. view of sexual harassment as a discrete, individual tort
places the plaintiff in a difficult position in that an occurrence cannot be both a tort and a routine
condition of work); Epstein, supra note 61, at 416-17 (arguing that courts have given too narrow
an interpretation to hostile environment); Hadfield, supra note 3, at 1166-67 (contending that the
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evidence of the woman's past behavior;74 the circumstances under which
an employer may be held liable for harassment by a supervisor, co-
worker, or non-employee;75 and the applicability of the act to same-sex
harassment.76
pervasiveness inquiry is unworkable because it requires a normative judgment in each case about
the level of acceptable behavior).
73. Some lower courts use a "reasonable person" test while others use a "reasonable
woman" standard to judge whether the harassing behavior is sufficiently severe and pervasive to
alter the employment setting and to create a hostile environment. Compare Gillming v. Sim-
mons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court properly used a
reasonable person test), and DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591,
594 (5th Cir. 1995) (same), with Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th
Cir. 1994) (approving the use of a reasonable woman standard). Both approaches have spawned
a number of critics. See Abrams, supra note 56, at 1031-33, 1036 (noting that the "reasonable
woman" test glosses over the diversity among women and typically is employed by white male
judges who lack any direct access to how a "reasonable woman" thinks); Anita Bernstein,
Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 471-82 (1997) (arguing
that neither a reasonable person nor a reasonable woman test is workable); Estrich, supra note
49, at 845-46 (observing that judges often create the "reasonable woman" out of air or use, as a
standard, other women at the workplace who have silently put up with the conduct and that, as a
result, it often takes a "real man" to be a "reasonable woman"); Hadfield, supra note 3, at 1179
(advocating a variation of the rational woman test). See generally Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Plural-
ist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99
YALE L.J. 1177 (1990) (arguing that a "reasonableness" standard cannot work because it ob-
scures the diversity among women); Frank S. Ravitch, Hostile Work Environment and the Ob-
jective Reasonableness Conundrum: Deriving a Workable Framework from Tort Law for Ad-
dressing Knowing Harassment of Hypersensitive Employees, 36 B.C. L. REV. 257 (1995)
(arguing that a standard based on "reasonableness" is unsatisfactory because it does not protect
the employee who is known to be more sensitive).
74. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir.
1992) (reversing the district court's finding that a woman who posed nude in magazine could not
be offended by employer's sexual advances). Susan Estrich notes that, given the double stan-
dard for gender in society, such credibility issues tend to work against women. While a man
with an active sex life is typically viewed as normal, a woman who is equally sexually active is
likely to be seen as promiscuous. See Estrich, supra note 49, at 848-49. See also Abrams, su-
pra note 66, at 1209 (arguing that a court should focus on the response of the woman and not the
intent of the man and ask whether the man's conduct was likely to create a feeling of subordina-
tion and devaluation); Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1273-75 (observing that by concentrating on
the fault of the defendant, Title VII litigation places the plaintiff in the role of victim, and con-
sequently the plaintiff is often called upon to show she is without fault); Kelly A. Cahill, Hoot-
ers: Should There Be An Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1144-52 (1995) (arguing that an assumption of
the risk defense should be permitted in Title VII hostile environment cases); Ellen E. Schultz
and Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs' Sex Lives Are Being Laid Bare in Harassment
Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al (reporting that after the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which allows plaintiffs in discrimination and harassment suits to recover punitive
damages and emotional-distress awards, defense lawyers are increasingly asking about plaintiffs'
sex lives and other personal matters).
75. In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that, in hostile environment cases, an employer is
not automatically liable for the actions of its employees. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Lower
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However, the disputes regarding Title VII's application to sex go
much deeper than how the law should be interpreted on particular gender
issues. It is the depth of disagreement that distinguishes this debate from
others. While scholars often argue about whether a particular form of
speech is protected by the First Amendment or whether a particular trade
courts have held that, absent quid pro quo harassment or harassment by a proprietor, partner, or
corporate officer, an employer is liable if it knew or should have known about the harassment
and failed to take reasonable steps to rectify the situation. See, e.g., Andrade v. Mayfair Man-
agement, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 1996); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d
103, 106 (3d Cir. 1994). Therefore, in numerous cases, liability turns on factual inquiries into
what the employer knew, how promptly it acted, and the reasonableness of its actions. See Far-
pella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d. 803, 807 (5th Cir. 1996); Knox v. Indiana, 93
F.3d 1327, 1355 (7th Cir. 1996); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir.
1995); Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 450 (3d Cir. 1994); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255
(4th Cir. 1983) ("[O]nce the plaintiff... proves that harassment took place, the most difficult
legal question typically will concern the responsibility of the employer for that harassment.").
See also Glen A. Staszewski, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in Finding Employer Li-
ability for a Supevisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1057, 1071-96 (1995) (collecting cases).
Here too, commentators have debated the issue. Compare Estrich, supra note 49, at 853-
55 (arguing that in all Title VII cases, including hostile environment cases, there should be strict
liability for the employer because the harassing employee is necessarily using the authority of his
office in the conduct and the pervasiveness element shows the employer knew or should have
known of the conduct), and David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 66, 131-49 (describing cases and criticizing the courts' failure to impose vicarious liability
on a uniform basis on employers in cases involving sexual harassment by supervisors), with
EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 363-64 (arguing that strict liability ought be applied against the em-
ployer only if it received notice and refused to act, because the harasser acts for himself and not
on behalf of the firm).
76. Just prior to this Article going to print, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does ap-
ply to same-sex harassment. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998
WL 88039, at *5 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998). Previously, the Fifth Circuit had held that same-sex
harassment was not actionable under Title VII. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d
446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Circuit had held that same-sex harassment was action-
able if the harasser was homosexual. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138,
141 (4th Cir. 1996). Where the harasser and target were both heterosexual, the Fourth Circuit
had held that the same sex harassment was not actionable. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County
Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
The Sixth Circuit had held that same-sex harassment was actionable, at least where the harasser
was homosexual. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxvile, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir.
1997). See Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the Heterosexist Para-
digm of Title VII, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 375, 388-97 (1995) (collecting cases and arguing
that Tide VII should apply to all same-sex harassment, regardless of sexual orientation of par-
ties); Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing Sexual
Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 383, 406-08 (1995) (arguing that
Title VII should apply to harassment of gays and lesbians). See also Franke, supra note 1, at
32-35 (describing Title VII cases involving transgendered persons); Levit, supra note 56, at
1063-67 (discussing problems men have in bringing sexual harassment suits against other men or
against women).
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restraint violates the antitrust laws, rarely does anyone question the un-
derlying goals of free speech or of a competitive marketplace. What is
remarkable about Title VII debates is that after twenty years of legislation
and adjudication, there are still sharp disagreements among scholars and
lay people about such basic questions as: whether gender equality in em-
ployment is a desirable or achievable goal; whether Title VII is more
beneficial than harmful for women; whether sexual harassment can suc-
cessfully be subject to legislation and adjudication, and, if so, what con-
stitutes sexual harassment.
At one extreme are those commentators (principally Richard Posner
and Richard Epstein) who dispute the basic premise that sexual equality in
employment is a desirable and achievable goal. They argue that sex dis-
crimination is rational and efficient for some firms (for instance, those
that wish to minimize costs of internal worker conflict or those that wish
to present a particular image)77 and also a natural result of voluntary se-
lection of jobs by women and men.78 To the extent the law has had an ef-
fect, they say, it has made women as a group worse off by encouraging
firms to hire fewer women or to shift women to gender-stratified jobs.79
77. See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 59-63, 76-77 (arguing that there will always be some
discrimination because it is efficient for some firms in that, by selecting a homogeneous work
force, the firm reduces variations in tastes and reduces costs of settling conflicts among co-
workers and costs of enforcing informal work rules); Posner, supra note 6, at 1319-21 (asserting
that some discrimination in employment will be efficient for some firms and, that, therefore, we
should not expect (or want) to eradicate all differential treatment). See also Sunstein, supra note
58, at 2416-17 (predicting that free market will not eliminate all race or sex discrimination be-
cause some is economically rational). To the extent discrimination is not economically rational,
the argument goes, natural market forces will lead to less sex discrimination. See EPSTEIN, su-
pra note 52, at 41-43; Posner, supra note 6, at 1322-23. See also Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and
Temperament in Modem Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap,
37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 1064-83 (1995) (contending that biological differences in temperament
account for much of the phenomena of the glass ceiling, gender-stratified jobs, and gender wage
gap).
78. See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 368-69, 270-72 (arguing that women and men prefer
different jobs and that women who want children are likely to invest less in work skills and are
likely to gravitate to particular jobs); Browne, supra note 77, at 1022-31, 1086-88 (asserting that
biologically based differences in women's temperaments, priorities, and definitions of success
cause them to voluntarily select different jobs from men); Epstein, supra note 60, at 77-78
(stating that women voluntarily select certain jobs); Epstein, supra note 1, at 1042 (arguing that
biological differences between women and men account for part of the voluntary selection of
different jobs by each sex); Roback, supra note 9, at 122 (asserting that personal choice plays
significant role in gender gap).
79. See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 36, 73 (arguing that the victim of discrimination is
better off if she can obtain a job by selling her labor at a lower price for a "trial" period and that
antidiscrimination laws hurt employees by raising firm costs and leading to loss of some jobs);
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In addition, it has demoralized women through the implicit message that
they cannot succeed in the workplace on the basis of their merits.8" Ep-
stein concludes that the best solution is the repeal of Title VII insofar as it
relates to sex.
81
While numerous scholars have challenged the Posner/Epstein argu-
ments,82 these views are important in highlighting the depth of the debate
regarding Title VII's application to sex discrimination. Moreover, among
the many supporters of Title VII (who far outnumber those seeking its re-
peal), there is no consensus regarding how to improve the law or achieve
sexual equality in the workplace. 3
Even with sexual harassment, which everyone seemingly agrees is
improper and distorts the competitive workplace, 4 there continues to be
Posner, supra note 6, at 1326-29 (stating that the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1994), may cause a firm to hire fewer women because the act requires equal pay).
80. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 1045-46 (arguing that this demoralizing effect on women
must be regarded as one cost of the laws). The critics of Title VII also point to the cost of en-
forcement as a disadvantage of the federal law. See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 367; Posner,
supra note 6, at 1325.
81. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 1087 (arguing that all civil rights laws regulating private
employment should be repealed). See also Roback, supra note 9, at 133 (opposing more gov-
ernment intervention).
82. See Abrams, supra note 56, at 1022-28 (criticizing Epstein's argument that biological
differences account for almost all employment differences); Donohue, supra note 50, at 1348
(arguing that even if market will eventually correct for sexual discrimination, market forces take
time to operate and Title VII will speed up the process); Friesen, supra note 60, at 37-50 (argu-
ing that available statistics do not support "choice" theory); Paetzold & Gely, supra note 11, at
1547-48 (observing that women who appear to choose less demanding jobs may be locked out of
better positions); Rhode, supra note 60, at 1211-16 (asserting that the voluntary selection theory
exaggerates the truth and, in any case, cannot account for all employment discrimination); Sun-
stein, supra note 58, at 2420 (arguing that choices made without a full awareness of available
opportunities should be considered unfree and non-autonomous). See generally Marion Crain,
Rationalizing Inequality: An Antifeminist Defense of the "Free" Market, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 556 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)) (criticizing Epstein's theories regarding
sex discrimination); David A. Strauss, Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1007 (1992) (disputing Epstein's claims based on biological differences be-
tween sexes).
83. See, e.g., authorities cited supra notes 11 and 71-76. Feminists are often better at cri-
tiquing the status quo than finding constructive solutions. See Bartlett, supra note 3, at 334
("Feminists are good at pointing out the contradictions between society's stated norms and its
practices and how existing patterns of gender subordination are sustained .... As to the recon-
ciliations needed to reduce or resolve the contradictions and to upset existing patterns of subor-
dination, however, the feminist project flounders."); Cheryl B. Preston, This Old House: A
Blueprint For Constructive Feminism, 83 GEo. L.J. 2271, 2324 (1995) ("Feminism is best de-
veloped in its role as a critic. Feminist literature abounds on what is wrong with the law.").
84. Sexual harassment is economically costly in causing absenteeism, poor job perform-
ance, worker turnover, and diminished self-esteem. See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1260-62;
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debates over core issues. Again, Posner and Epstein stake out an extreme
position: Title VII need not be construed to cover harassment because the
problem will go away naturally with time as more women enter the job
market.85 Once again, their writings have been vigorously criticized by
other scholars. 6 Yet, here too, among those scholars who believe that
sexual harassment is properly considered a Title VII violation, there are
myriad views regarding how best to apply the law to claims of harass-
ment.
87
In large part, the verticality of Title VII is responsible for these fun-
damental philosophical disputes and for the law's failure to bring about
more concrete results in the workplace. By acting without meaningful
debates or studies of particular gender-in-employment problems, Con-
gress handed the courts, employers, and the public a statute with ambigu-
ous scope and application and lacking clear doctrinal underpinnings.8
In particular, Congress left open the crucial question of what equality
means with respect to the sexes.8 9 If courts apply to gender the same
"equality" approach that underlies the law's ban on racial discrimination,
then employers are prohibited from discriminating against one sex, de-
spite similar qualifications, just as they are barred from treating otherwise
Hadfield, supra note 3, at 1169-70. See also Levit, supra note 56, at 1064-65 (noting that men
who are sexually harassed face the same problems).
85. See Posner, supra note 6, at 1323. Richard Epstein suggests handling harassment un-
der state-law tort doctrine instead of Title VII. See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 350-66. Posner
and Epstein similarly argue that sex discrimination in hiring and promotion will naturally di-
minish due to natural market forces. See supra note 77.
86. See Donohue, supra note 50, at 1348-49 (contending that Title VII may speed up mar-
ket processes and also elevate women's self-esteem and improve current job satisfaction);
Mathews, supra note 50, at 303-04 (arguing that state tort doctrine is an inadequate remedy for
sexual harassment); Sunstein, supra note 58, at 2414-15 (stating that a free market cannot rem-
edy sex and race discrimination).
87. See authorities cited supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. See also Epstein et al.,
supra note 60, at 374 (noting that women of different ages have differing views on sexual har-
assment).
88. See Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2497-98 (observing that part of the confusion in
the case law under Title VII stems from the lack of any solid theoretical underpinning in the
cases granting relief).
89. See Freedman, supra note 4, at 922 (noting that, with respect to sex discrimination un-
der Title VII, the Supreme Court "has been unable to agree on the nature of sex differences,
their relationship to legitimate goals, and the correct standards for deciding [these] cases"); Julia
C. Lamber, And Promises to Keep: The Future in Employment Discrimination, 68 IND. L.J.
857, 858 (1993) ("Congress has never defined what it meant by discrimination nor articulated its
vision of equality . . . ."); George Rutherglen, Discrimination and its Discontents, 81 VA. L.
REV. 117, 127 (1995) (observing that much confusion arises from Title VII's failure to define
discrimination).
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equal black and white men differently.' The obvious problem is that the
sexes differ in ways (such as pregnancy) that the races do not.91 Thus, an
equality approach will protect only those women who are seen as equal to
men in meeting the specified job qualifications.' Yet, those qualifications
90. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE
L.J. 1373, 1374 (1986) (stating that the traditional notion of equality is Aristotelian: treating
"like persons alike, and unlike persons unlike"); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private In-
terests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. CT. REP. 127, 129 ("To require equality is
in essence to require that those similarly situated be treated similarly."). Numerous commenta-
tors have discussed the application of the equality theory to sex discrimination and the "same-
ness/difference" debate within feminism. See Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2479-80,
2482-83, 2518 (discussing equality theory and observing that Title VII was enacted and origi-
nally litigated under an equality-based account of discrimination); Franke, supra note 1, at 10-13
(reviewing early sex discrimination cases in which courts asked whether the sexual differences
of women justified the particular differing treatment); Levit, supra note 56, at 1042-44 (de-
scribing equality theory); MacKinnon, supra note 52, at 1286-92 (describing early use of equal-
ity theory in sex cases); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23
PAC. L.J. 1493, 1497-1522 (1992) (describing debate); Rhode, supra note 60, at 1225 (discuss-
ing equality theory and its weaknesses in gender cases); Turnier et al., supra note 5, at 1294-95
(describing equality theory and noting that in early cases feminists "patterned their efforts after
those of the [NAACP], which had relied on the rights-oriented liberal jurisprudence"). See gen-
erally Laura W. Stein, Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of
Privacy and Equality, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1153 (1993) (arguing that feminists should transform
the equality doctrine rather than abandon it).
In reviewing Supreme Court cases, Kenneth Karst found that when a woman's case fits into
the traditional direct-discrimination mold of race cases, the Court has less trouble with finding
discrimination. However, the Court has much more trouble with indirect sex discrimination,
such as state laws favoring veterans, and often demands a showing of intentional discrimination,
a burden that is almost impossible for the woman to carry. See Karst, supra note 12, at 465-70.
91. See Abrams, supra note 56, at 1029 (noting that in the sex discrimination cases, the
equality theory does not deny all biological differences but denies their relevance to a number of
institutional settings); Becker, supra note 3, at 983 ("[Society is] deeply committed to main-
taining difference between the sexes, no matter how artificial. [We] might be able to imagine a
world in which the races are equal. We cannot imagine a world in which the sexes are equal.");
Minow, supra note 56, at 40 (observing that by stressing equality, women run the risk of justi-
fying different treatment in areas where women are different from men). Those who wish to
eliminate or limit Title VII's application to sex emphasize the biological differences between the
sexes. See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 280-81 (arguing that the systematic differences between
the sexes matter in a way that differences between races do not); Browne, supra note 77, at
1017-31 (asserting that there are biologically based temperamental differences in men and
women that lead to different preferences and priorities).
92. For instance, an employer may view women as being less aggressive, less committed to
a long-term careers, less available for travel or relocation, or just less of a "fit" with the firm.
See Becker, supra note 3, at 979 (noting that even when the equality approach is successful, "it
only helps those women who are most like men"); Case, supra note 1, at 31-32 (observing that
the movement toward equal opportunity for women may have benefited chiefly those women
who most closely resemble men). Some commentators argue that this is the proper result. See
Browne, supra note 77, at 1074-81, 1093-96 (contending that biologically based temperamental
differences between the sexes account for much of the gender wage gap and gender-stratified
jobs and that, in fairness, only those women willing to work "like men" deserve the higher
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likely assume a male norm,93 and leave unaided the woman who, by tem-
perament or family situation, does not fit the "ideal" mold. 94
On the other hand, if courts use a "difference" approach that re-
quires firms to accommodate the differences between the sexes, 95 employ-
ers may be reluctant to hire women because of the added cost of accom-
modating such differences as pregnancy.' Or, firms may use perceived
paying jobs); Epstein, supra note 60, at 88 (arguing that an employer is right to ask whether an
applicant will be a good "fit" with the firm).
The equality theory also leaves untouched the institutional biases against women, such as
lack of pregnancy leave, day care, and flexible hours. While the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1994), provides some protection for women during childbirth
and recovery, it only covers firms with more than 50 workers and only guarantees unpaid leave.
See Crain, supra note 4, at 1921 (observing that the act helps upper- and middle-class women
who can afford to take unpaid leave); Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 2189-92 (de-
scribing the potential adverse effects of the law, including the possibility that it may provide an
incentive to employers to discriminate in hiring against women). But see Browne, supra note
77, at 1071, 1089-90 (arguing that day care and maternity leave are unlikely to make significant
differences in the overall position of women in the workplace because most women choose to
invest more time with children than men do).
93. Numerous scholars have commented on the unspoken assumption that the normal or
ideal worker is male. See Abrams, Sex Wars, supra note 5, at 315 n.44 (arguing that our con-
ceptual framework assumes men are the norm); Crain, supra note 4, at 1921 (arguing that Title
VII accepts the white male occupational pattern as the neutral, universal norm and rewards only
those few women whose occupational tracks resemble those of white men); Levit, supra note
56, at 1042 ("Equal treatment theory view[s] men as the benchmark, the norm."); Minow, su-
pra note 56, at 38-40 (observing that the unstated norm in employment is the white male);
Rhode, supra note 60, at 1222-23 (noting that generally women work in places designed by and
for men, with advancement criteria created by men).
94. Here too, numerous scholars have addressed this problem. See, Abrams, Gender Dis-
crimination, supra note 66, at 1187-89; Crain, supra note 4, at 1921; Littleton, supra note 13,
at 1280 n.2; Minow, supra note 56, at 41; Rhode, supra note 60, at 1222-26. See also Sun-
stein, supra note 58, at 2429 (arguing that, rather than using the equality approach, courts
should ask whether practice contributes to maintenance of second-class citizenship or lower-caste
status for women).
95. See Abrams, supra note 56, at 1030 (describing the difference theory); Franke, supra
note 1, at 30 ("[T]he Difference Feminists argue that inequality is the result of a failure to rec-
ognize factually and normatively significant differences between the sexes and criticize the lib-
eral model for demanding that all people assimilate to a male norm cloaked in neutral cloth-
ing."); Levit, supra note 56, at 1044-47 (describing difference theory). The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994), is based on the difference theory in that it
requires accommodation of pregnancy. However, the decisions under this law have also been
confusing and conflicting. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 2179-89 (discussing
Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
96. Deborah Rhode notes that the early laws limiting the hours that women could work
were the result of feminists who embraced the sex-based differences between men and women.
While at the time this made sense, this approach also "protected" women out of the best jobs
and helped perpetuate sex-based disadvantages. Rhode, supra note 56, at 1737-41. See also
Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 2171-76 (discussing the paradox of protective leg-
islation that, on the one hand, protects women from oppressive conditions, but, on the other
hand, hurts women by raising the cost of hiring them and treats them like idiots or minors). For
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sexual differences to justify the lack of women in certain jobs. 7 Ideologi-
cally, granting "different" treatment to women can create a backlash:
men may feel they are not being treated equally, 9 and women may feel
that the "special" treatment is stigmatizing and belittling of their achieve-
ments. 99
a history of protective legislation, see BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 80-130 (2d ed. 1996). A current example of protective legislation is the male-
only draft. See Karst, supra note 12, at 449-50 (characterizing the Supreme Court's decision
upholding the male-only military draft as an example of the Court's "protection" of women).
See also Levit, supra note 56, at 1059-60 (noting that a male-only draft perpetuates stereotype of
men as aggressors).
Scholars have discussed the additional cost an employer may incur due to worker preg-
nancy. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 2168, 2192-99 (observing that the
treatment of pregnancy is a particularly difficult problem because some risk-averse employers
will discriminate against all women based on the assumption that many women will leave the
workplace following child birth and such discrimination is especially unfair to those women who
do not intend to leave work); Minow, supra note 56, at 19 (describing dilemma of needing
"special" treatment for pregnancy but wanting to avoid backlash and reactivating negative
stereotypes); Rutherglen, supra note 89, at 141 (noting that the "dispute over pregnancy under
Title VII illustrates the distortions caused by trying to assimilate sex to race"). But see
EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 280-81 (arguing that treating pregnancy differently from other con-
ditions is not discrimination at all).
97. For instance, the argument can be made that given their psychological differences
women voluntarily avoid certain positions. For commentators asserting this position, see
sources cited supra note 98. Probably no judicial decision has come under more fire than EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aft'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th
Cir. 1988), where the court accepted Sears' argument that the underrepresentation of women in
big-commission jobs was due to a voluntary avoidance of these jobs by women. For criticisms
of this decision, see Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2484; Rhode, supra note 56, at 1768-
70, 1784-87; Williams, supra note 1, at 813-20. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 385-91
(defending the Sears decision).
98. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 60, at 2177 (noting that protective laws for
women seem "to violate two separate equality principles: equality of opportunity and equality
of actual treatment"); Rhode, supra note 56, at 1737, 1767 (observing that most people believe
in a "just" world where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get and noting that
resentment arises over any suggestion of "special treatment" for a woman's family responsibili-
ties). See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board
of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 547,
562-64 (1995) (noting that, in the racial context, many whites felt that blacks were unjustly
asking for special, not merely equal, treatment).
99. See Abrams, supra note 56, at 1030-34 (noting the dangers of stigmatizing and limiting
women that come from generalizing about women under a difference theory); Epstein, supra
note 57, at 1045-46 (arguing that laws that treat women as a protected class imply that women
cannot succeed in the workplace on their own merit and are thereby demoralizing for women);
Harris, supra note 12, at 613 (arguing that we need to avoid treating all women as victims); Ra-
din, supra note 15, at 136-38 (describing how being seen as a recipient of affirmative action can
be a badge of inferiority); Rhode, supra note 4, at 1184 (noting that some feminists argue that
even those government programs that seem to help women, such as welfare, can also be seen as
detrimentally stigmatizing women).
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Furthermore, whichever approach a court uses, Title VII's one-size-
fits-all rules engender an assumption that there is a fairly consistent pat-
tern of discrimination against a relatively generic woman by an equally
generic employer."° As a result, all too often courts gloss over diversity
among women and the tremendous variety of employment situations and
discrimination they face. 1o' However, the obvious truth is that women of
100. See Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2482 (noting that, in early feminist work, the
use of a single generic woman was partly strategic in that it highlighted women's exclusion,
streamlined the message, and downplayed complexity and contradiction within the women's
movement); Minow, supra note 56, at 64 (observing that people are attracted to simplified
stereotypes because they help us organize and categorize experience). Under an equality ap-
proach, the generic woman tends to be basically interchangeable with the generic man. A dif-
ference approach may lead to an equally stereotypical and unrealistic portrayal of women: as
moral, sensitive, nurturing, and peacemaking creatures. See Levit, supra note 56, at 1045 (ob-
serving that the difference theory pictures women as caring, relationship-seeking, collaborative,
sensitive, empathetic, and nurturing); Rhode, supra note 56, at 1786-87 (arguing that not only is
the difference theory not supported by empirical studies but additionally it reinforces stereotypes
and fails to address variations of culture, class, race, age, ethnicity, and sexual orientation);
Williams, supra note 1, at 802-07 (noting that the difference theory uses a stereotype similar to
the 18th century view of women as moral, nurturing, contextual thinkers).
Regardless of the approach, the generic woman tends to be white, educated, middle-class,
and heterosexual. See SPELMAN, supra note 12, at 76 (asserting that too many feminist theorists
focus on the experiences of white, middle-class women, thereby obscuring the experiences of
other women); Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2482 (noting the great variety in women's
experiences as opposed to the Title VII case law that tends to assume women are white, hetero-
sexual and middle-class); Crain, supra note 4, at 1905, 1906 (arguing that feminist concerns
have been directed too much to the interests of white, upper- and middle-class women and have
failed to look at the problems of working class women); Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 144-45
(observing that courts tend to assume that women are white); Harris, supra note 12, at 595-96
(contending that much feminist theory ignores black women). A blatant example of the ten-
dency to overlook black women is found in EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 279, where he states that
.women were never slaves." See generally Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for
Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995) (discussing effect
of assuming a white norm on employees of color).
101. Underneath the heated rhetoric, both critics of Title VII and feminists are beginning to
come together on the danger of stereotyping. There is an increased awareness on all sides that
there is no generic woman, no generic employer, and no one prototype employment situation.
See Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2481 (noting that Title VII needs to respond to the com-
plexity of women and the variety of forms of discrimination); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 847 (1990) (arguing that feminists need to avoid slip-
ping into "white solipsism"); Becker, supra note 3, at 980 (stating that "it is desirable to treat
people as individuals rather than assuming that all women act one way or have one set of needs
and all men act another way or have a different set of needs"); Case, supra note 1, at 36-41, 50
(describing different forms of sexual stereotyping and noting that it can harm effeminate men as
well as women); Epstein et al., supra note 60, at 408-09 (noting that women of different ages
have significantly different views of sex discrimination in employment); Greene, supra note 4,
at 1261 (observing that we cannot assume sameness among the experiences of all women given
differing race, class, and other demographic features); Harris, supra note 12, at 610-12 (arguing
that we need to acknowledge the broad diversity among women); Levit, supra note 56, at 1050,
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color may face discrimination that is quite different from that experienced
by white women;" young women may encounter situations different from
those experienced by older women; a factory worker may have problems
different from those encountered by a professional woman; an assertive
woman may face situations far different from those experienced by an in-
troverted woman. Similarly, just as their experiences vary, so too women
inevitably vary in how they view sex discrimination in employment and in
the "solutions" they support."°
Title VII's effectiveness is further limited by its reactive, litigation
orientation. Other than lawsuit avoidance, Title VII does nothing to en-
courage the proactive resolution of problems before they grow into full-
blown disputes." 4 Instead, Title VII waits for a chance to punish a done
1073-74 (observing that sexual stereotyping can also harm men); MacKinnon, supra note 52, at
1292-93 (discussing harm of stereotyping); Minow, supra note 56, at 58-62 (noting that women
need to consider various and conflicting viewpoints); Radford, supra note 11, at 486-503 (de-
scribing problem of stereotyping); Rhode, supra note 4, at 1182, 1185 (observing that differ-
ences in factors such as race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation preclude the existence of a
"generic woman"). Richard Epstein, a critic of Title VII insofar as it applies to sex, echoes the
same view as these feminist writers in warning that it is wrong to assume that all employers act
alike or that all employees have the same preferences. See EPsTEIN, supra note 52, at 44.
102. Additionally, there will be differences among women of color and the experiences they
face. See Harris, supra note 12, at 584-95 (observing that not only is there no unitary woman,
there are also differences among women of color and, over time, within any given woman).
103. See Cain, supra note 5, at 839, 841-42 (observing that a single feminist approach is
unlikely to emerge given the diversity of women and their varying experiences). Increasingly,
feminists have sought ways to accommodate the variety among women and their experiences.
See Abrams, Title VII, supra note 5, at 2482-91 (noting that, increasingly, feminist theory em-
phasizes diversity among women); Littleton, supra note 13, at 1312-14 (proposing "acceptance"
approach as alternative to equality and difference approaches); Martha Minow, Introduction:
Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our Beyond, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1989)
(describing the "first-wave" feminists as seeking the same rights as men, the "second-wave"
feminists as recognizing the differences between the sexes, and the "third-wave" feminists as
rejecting the preoccupation with the sameness-difference debate); Radin, supra note.3, at 1718
(advocating a middle ground between equality theory and difference theory); Rhode, supra note
56, at 1789-90 (same).
104. A number of commentators have remarked on the limited benefits that litigation pro-
duces. See MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 155 (concluding from empirical study that "[bjy
themselves, Supreme Court decisions seldom greatly influence American public opinion either
over the short term or the long term"); ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 212, 214-18 (noting that
even though women have won a number of lawsuits, "there is little evidence that these Court
victories have much changed the position of women in American society" and concluding that
judicial decisions will be ineffective in bringing about gender equality in the workplace absent
changes in cultural beliefs and practices); Abrams, supra note 56, at 1039 (advocating an in-
creased emphasis on non-litigation strategies with respect to issues of sex discrimination in the
workplace); Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave-Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect
Social Change in the 1990s?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1252, 1254-55 (1993) (observing that one
reason women are increasingly moving away from the "big case" approach of the past is because
they recognize that they remain outsiders to power in political bodies and centers of economic
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deed."~ Additionally, the lawsuit that Title VII provides the aggrieved
worker is hardly cost-free. Not only does litigation involve substantial
time and money," it often exacts significant psychic costs on the plain-
tiff, the employer, and co-workers. Typically it places a woman in the
role of victim and requires that she individually assert some act of dis-
crimination committed by a usually male employer."° On the other side,
the litigation thrusts the employer into the role of wrongdoer, who was at
best insensitive and, at worst, intentionally discriminatory.0 8 Not sur-
prisingly, even if the plaintiff succeeds in her litigation battle, she (and
possibly others) may lose the employment war. The winner-take-all liti-
gation format may well leave such deep resentment, that continued em-
ployment at the firm is not feasible for the plaintiff,"9 or it may severely
power). But see Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1331, 1343-44 (1995) (arguing that even when litigation is lost, society may benefit by
having dispute aired and by spurring people into action).
105. My colleague David Dominguez suggested to me this concise way of describing Title
VII.
Scholars have discussed the use of binding arbitration for Title VII complaints. See
Brooks, supra note 53, at 518 (noting that a study showed that between 1991 and 1994, women
prevailed in only 2 of 16 verified arbitrations); Ellwood F. Oakley, III, and Donald 0. Mayer,
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary Federal-
ism, 47 S.C. L. REV. 475, 486-88 (1996); Note, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination
Claims: The Lower Courts Extend Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. to Include Individ-
ual Employment Contracts, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 446-71 (1996); Developments, supra note
53, at 1671-83 (arguing that the arbitration process favors employers). See also Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (holding that a claim brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988), was subject to an arbitration
clause in the parties' contract).
106. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 1196 (discussing one discrimination lawsuit in which there
were 74 court days and 73 witnesses, and another which generated five million dollars in legal
fees). For a description of Title VII's procedural labyrinth, see Brooks, supra note 53, at 512-
50. The confusion within the federal judiciary on Title VII procedural issues is set forth in De-
velopments, supra note 53, at 1579-1601.
107" See ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 223-24 (noting that an important barrier to sex dis-
crimination litigation is the reluctance of women who have suffered discrimination to be plain-
tiffs); Crain, supra note 4, at 1920 (noting that discrimination laws place economic and psycho-
logical burdens on women by requiring them to identify themselves as individual victims).
108. See Harris, supra note 15, at 768 (arguing that we need to get away from seeing op-
pression as an all-or-nothing concept, in which one is either a victim or an oppressor, because in
reality the same group can be oppressed and privileged at the same time); Karst, supra note 12,
at 488 (observing that discrimination lawsuits in the U.S. inevitably focus on intent and conse-
quently look to the goodness or evil of the parties); Levit, supra note 56, at 1080 (arguing that
"[i]nstead of constructing an argument of blame, we must ask what is a responsible approach for
the future in the sense of justice, fairness, and rational ethics"). See also Delgado & Stefancic,
supra note 98, at 562-64 (noting that, in context of race relations, the "fault" question increased
the resistance to change).
109. See Abrams, supra note 66, at 1196 ("[L]itigation imposes enormous costs, in hostility
and in ostracization, on the women involved. Lingering resentments ... can penalize women
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strain relations among co-workers who find themselves in opposing camps
in the lawsuit."' Furthermore, the successful plaintiff may well find the
judicial remedy she receives does not make her whole financially."'
To summarize, Title VII's vertical development and testing has re-
sulted in a law: (1) whose fundamental premises are disputed by both
scholars and lay people, (2) whose ultimate interpreter is a single tribunal
largely imniune from hearing from the voices of rank and file workers
and employers, (3) whose doctrinal underpinnings are ambiguous at best
(and, more likely, nonexistent), and (4) whose judicial interpretation has
resulted in a confusing and conflicting body of case law that all too often
smacks of law-making. Not surprisingly, Title VII's application to sex
seems to create as much discord as it settles.
I. Horizontal Legal Development and Testing
The Uniform Commercial Code and state common and statutory law
present long-standing examples of horizontal jurisprudence. Negotiated
regulations for administrative agencies show a more recent implementa-
tion of a horizontal approach to the development of rules. Moreover, all
three examples are instructive in that each demonstrates different aspects
of horizontal jurisprudence that could be utilized with issues of gender in
the workplace.
external to the suit itself."); Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1269 (observing that just bringing a sex-
ual harassment claim can destroy a woman's reputation and career); Estrich, supra note 49, at
833 (noting that serious disincentives to suing include embarrassment, publicity, and difficulty in
getting another job); Rhode, supra note 4, at 1196 (noting that plaintiffs place their conduct,
character, and capabilities at issue and risk collegial hostility, retaliation, and blacklisting); Clint
O'Connor, He Said. She Said. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), Mar. 13, 1994, at 1H ("The complaint is trivialized, or the woman is blamed-she has
trouble relating to men, she has emotional problems, she has PMS, she wore short skirts so she
deserved it.").
110. See Abrams, supra note 66, at 1196, 1215-16 (noting that a lawsuit often disrupts the
Plaintiff's relationship with co-workers and that isolated lawsuits, even if successful, may not
bring significant changes in the workplace).
111. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 places a cap on awards of compensatory and punitive
damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). Moreover, even with the expanded damages that
the 1991 amendments to Title VII allow, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994), the likelihood of small
damage awards may make it difficult for some women to get attorneys to take their cases. See
Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1267. For a description of the remedies currently available under
Title VII, see Brooks, supra note 53, at 520-26. See also Susan K. Grebeldinger, The Role of
Workplace Hostility in Determining Prospective Remedies for Employment Discrimination: A
Call for Greater Judicial Discretion in Awarding Front Pay, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 319, 328,
334-42 (arguing that the typical remedy of reinstatement is often inadequate and impractical).
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A. The Uniform Commercial Code
Probably no law in this century has had a more horizontal develop-
ment than the Uniform Commercial Code. In developing the Code, the
drafters used a town-meeting, consensual approach.12  With both the
original Code and with subsequent amendments, the drafting committees,
made up of academics and practitioners,"' met regularly with and sought
advice directly from representatives of the affected parties. 114  Drafting
meetings were public, with all affected interests encouraged to participate.
As a result, literally scores of people attended drafting meetings." 5 In
112. The drafting of the UCC is done jointly by the American Law Institute and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The UCC drafting process is de-
scribed in Fred H. Miller, U. C. C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42
ALA. L. REv. 405, 407-12 (1991); Ring, supra note 46, at 290, 296; Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 596-97, 600-
01 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1803-05 (1994);
Warren, supra note 46, at 813-16; and Zipporah Batchan Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Liewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARv. L. REV. 465, 472-92 (1987). For a description
of the historical development of commercial law, see Cooter, supra note 26, at 1647-48, 1651-
52; Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process:
Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83, 93-98 (1993); see
generally Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff.
The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 351 (1983). For a
description of the social and economic philosophies that influenced the original UCC drafting,
see Allen R. Kamp, Between-The-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the
Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REv. 325, 345-81 (1995).
113. See Ring, supra note 46, at 294 (reporting that the drafting committee for Article 4A
was composed of three law professors, one judge, and six practicing attorneys who represented
different types of clients and that the committee sought extensive input from advisors knowl-
edgeable in various aspects of funds transfers). See also Scott, supra note 112, at 1805, 1807
(noting that "real lawyers" tend to hold sway over academics).
114. See Patchel, supra note 112, at 98 (noting that the UCC was "the first uniform laws
project to make extensive use of consultation with interested groups at the drafting stage");
Ring, supra note 46, at 294-95 (reporting that, in drafting Article 4A, 23 observers, represent-
ing financial institutions and users of wire transfers, regularly attended drafting committee
meetings and "brought a great deal of practicality and reality to the discussions of the drafting
committee"); James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U. C. C. Article 8, 43 UCLA
L. RaV. 1431, 1543-44 (1996) (observing that, with revised Article 8, the committee "made
special efforts to reach out to groups with interests in the matters covered ... in order to learn
the problems and needs of the securities business," so the final draft was "the product of many
years of work, involving a large group of knowledgeable lawyers and business people from all
sectors of the securities industry, as well as representatives from all of the securities regulatory
agencies and central banking authorities.., and dedicated generalist lawyers").
115. See Ring, supra note 46, at 296 (describing the UCC drafting meetings as "fully open"
with "meaningful dialogue occur[ring] ... [where] each participant is ... given an opportunity
to voice opinions and concerns" and noting that, with Article 4A, there were a total of 16 draft-
ing meetings and 57 days of debate, and that 50 or more people attended each drafting meeting);
Rogers, supra note 114, at 1543 (reporting that, for the revisions of Article 8, there were "at
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addition, after the publication of a proposed section, experts in the field
sent in "a flood of written commentary, 11 6 which the drafting committee
then used in preparing new drafts that were also published and subject to
comment.
1 7
As Zipporah Wiseman states, the original Code was "the result of a
sometimes painful twenty-year period of compromise among a broad
range of participants."' William Warren similarly describes the more
recent drafting sessions for Article 4A as allowing many people, who
knew a "great deal about the subject" but who had "diverse and conflict-
ing interests" to "sit around a table and talk to each other about the prob-
least nine three-day Drafting Committee meetings, all of which were attended by a large group
of advisors and observers," as well as discussions of preliminary drafts with various consulting
groups, state and local bar associations, and continuing legal education programs); Warren, su-
pra note 46, at 814 (noting that sometimes a hundred people attend drafting meetings).
While the UCC drafting sessions are open to all groups, commentators note that the process
is not immune from all interest-group pressure. See Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug
of War with the Whores or Who is Saving the UCC?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 563, 568 (1993);
A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 679 (1996); Patchel,
supra note 112, at 120-25; Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like A Lawyer, Acting Like A Lobbyist:
Some Notes on the Process of Revising Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743, 748-59
(1993); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 112, at 615-24. But see Peter A. Alces & David Frisch,
On The UCC Revision Process: A Reply to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1217, 1238
(1996) (arguing that the influence of interest groups has been overstated); Donald J. Rapson,
Who Is Looking Out For the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the
Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 249, 263-65
(1994) (same); Miller, supra note 45, at 871-73 (same); Scott, supra note 112, at 1809 (noting
that industry influence does not necessarily imply that the final product will be biased).
116. Warren, supra note 46, at 814. See also Ring, supra note 46, at 294 (noting that, in
the drafting of Article 4A, the committee received numerous telephone calls and hundreds of
commenting letters from experts in fund transfers). See generally Lawrence Susskind & Gerald
McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 150
(1985) (discussing the importance in successful negotiated rulemaking of circulating for review
written summaries of agreements reached at meetings and drafts of proposed rules).
117. See Ring, supra note 46, at 297 (noting that drafts are prepared and widely circulated
in advance of each meeting, so that if someone cannot attend, that person can nonetheless call or
write to the committee reporter).
Indeed, many commentators believe that one attempt to amend Articles 3 and 4 failed pre-
cisely because too many decisions were made by the drafting committee without sufficient op-
portunity for interested parties to be heard. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld, Strange Bedfellows for
Electronic Funds Transfers: Proposed Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
UNC1TRAL Model Law, 42 ALA. L. REV. 723, 728-29 (1991); Miller, supra note 112, at 408-
09; Overby, supra note 115, at 680-81; Patchel, supra note 112, at 108; Warren, supra note 46,
at 813. Similarly, some scholars contend that significant amendments were necessary to Article
2A because the original drafting process lacked full participation of interested groups and the
article was promulgated with insufficient comments and testing. See Neil B. Cohen & Barry L.
Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for the New Millennium: Will the Current Process Suf-
fice? 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 551, 554-55 (1993); Ring, supra note 46, at 290.
118. Wiseman, supra note 112, at 467.
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lems to be solved. 1. 9  In the beginning, differences among the major
groups "seemed intractable" as people "seemed to enjoy bashing each
other. " '20 However, as the participants spent more time together and
came to know and respect one another, "differences were narrowed and a
reasonable degree of consensus achieved.', 2 1  This eventual consensus
among the interested parties was, in turn, reflected in the speedy and vir-
tually unanimous adoption of Article 4A by the states."
Moreover, using such a participatory approach insured the drafting
committee would not impose theoretically based rules top down on the
business community. Instead, industry participation focused discussions
and eventual solutions on concrete problems in commercial transac-
tions." Equally important, inclusion of interested parties in the drafting
119. Warren, supra note 46, at 814-15. Never before, Warren says, had so many people
knowledgeable about the issues spent so much time together. Id. See also Felsenfeld, supra
note 117, at 763 (noting that Article 4A "is a carefully honed set of compromises among
implementers of funds transfers ... and the users of those transfers"); Ring, supra note 46, at
296 (observing that in the UCC drafting process, participants are encouraged to become inti-
mately familiar with the concerns of one another and to work together in formulating revisions
and that, consequently, the drafting process becomes an "in-depth and lengthy dialogue among
the various interested participants"); Rogers, supra note 114, at 1543 (observing that the revised
Article 8 "is the product of a process that... functioned well to bring together the specialized
information of experts in securities clearance and settlement and the practical wisdom of gener-
alist lawyers").
120. Warren, supra note 46, at 815.
121. Id. at 815. Carlyle Ring similarly notes that although debate can be heated, over time,
appreciation grows for the perspectives of others and suggestions evolve that accommodate the
concerns of each party. Ring describes the final Article 4A as a real, not forced, accommoda-
tion and one that is "relative perfection" in the eyes of any one group in that the code provides,
"on balance, substantial improvements in the law while avoiding any major disruption and con-
frontation with legitimate concerns of any particular participant." Ring, supra note 46, at 290,
296.
122. See Miller, supra note 45, at 869-70; Warren, supra note 46, at 816. For instance,
Article 4A was promulgated in 1989 and available for legislative enactment in 1990. By June 1,
1994, 49 states had adopted it. See Ring, supra note 46, at 298. See also Warren, supra note
46, at 815 (noting that 40 states enacted Article 4A within the first three years). Similarly, the
newly revised Article 8 was available for adoption in 1994, and over half the states had adopted
it before the second year of legislative activity. See Rogers, supra note 114, at 1432. See also
infra note 129 and accompanying text.
123. See authorities cited supra note 114. In part the drafting style for the UCC reflected
Karl Llewellyn's philosophy of legal realism: a belief that law ought to be "close to facts" in
the sense that legal rules are developed and assessed against a background of the everyday trans-
actions they govern. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 624 (1975). See Wiseman, supra note 112, at 501
(observing that Llewellyn's legal realism was based on the recognition that "law changes more
readily through asserted continuities [with the past rather] than avowed departures"). See also
John L. Gedid, U. C. C. Methodology: Taking A Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 341, 359, 363 (1988). For discussions of the legal realism philosophy, see generally
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stage also gave the Code legitimacy in the business community.24 The
result is a law successfully used for over 30 years and regarded as "one




The UCC also offers vivid proof that a horizontal, consensual. ap-
proach does not necessarily lead simply to ratifying the status quo. Al-
though some parts of the Code codified existing practices, in other areas
the Code marked a vast improvement on procedures then in use.'2 6 For
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Joseph William
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988); William Twining, Talk About Real-
ism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329 (1985).
124. There are, to be sure, other reasons for the UCC's success. Unlike other laws that are
enacted piecemeal, the drafters of the UCC dealt with large sections of commercial law at one
time. In addition, politics were largely kept out of the drafting. See Overby, supra note 115, at
675 (arguing that unlike other lawmaking bodies, the sponsors of the UCC are unique in re-
maining largely politically unaccountable to any constituent body). But see authorities cited su-
pra note 115. Some would argue that the Code deals with dry, unemotional money matters on
which gaining consensus is relatively easy. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
Moreover, there is, to be sure, litigation under the UCC and some sections work better than
others. For instance, the newly revised Articles 3 and 4 have been criticized by some commen-
tators, while supported by others. Compare Rubin, supra note 115, at 749-59 (criticizing some
provisions), with Overby, supra note 115, at 695-710 (arguing that the basic structure of the
Articles is sound). See generally Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial
Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952) (criticizing original UCC); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994) (arguing that Article
9 unfairly favors secured over unsecured creditors). Yet, the Code has undergone a relatively
small number of amendments, and the business community successfully operates under its rules.
However, Gerald McLaughlin speculates that, in the future, the UCC may play a diminishing
role as international trade increases and noncommercial interests, such as the environment, be-
come more significant. See Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolving Uniform Commercial Code:
From Infancy to Maturity to Old Age, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 701-02 (1993).
125. Grant Gilmore, Philosophy of Law, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 812, 815 (1974) (book re-
view). Admittedly Gilmore was one of the Code's chief architects and, therefore, likely some-
what biased. A more recent scholar characterized the Code as "the most successful codification
in American law." Wiseman, supra note 112, at 466. See also 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1 (3d ed. 1988) (characterizing the UCC as "the
most spectacular success story in the history of American law"); Overby, supra note 115, at 653
("The UCC unquestionably is the [National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws]'s biggest success story."); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic
Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 131, 150 (1996) (noting that the UCC has
been highly successful and efficient unlike some other uniform laws); Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 112, at 637 ("The UCC is the most influential and widely adopted uniform law."). But see
authorities cited infra note 141 with respect to consumer issues.
126. In describing the early work on the Code, Soia Mentschikoff explained that drafters
never asked: "What are we going to do to change the existing law?" but, instead, posed the
question: "How shall we resolve these problems?" If the eventual solution was the same as or a
modification of existing law, that was fine. But, if the solution was wholly different from ex-
isting law, that was fine too. As Mentschikoff quipped: "Knowledge about the law can be a
great hindrance when you're trying to decide on a sensible approach." Soia Mentschikoff, Re-
flections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 540-42 (1982). See also Bane, supra note 112, at
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example, Article 9 "had almost no precedent in terms of an integrated
statute," and pulled together statutory bundles that had existed in discrete,
overlapping, even inconsistent forms and coordinated them into a working
code.' 27 Similarly, at the time Article 4A was conceived, "there was no
law or significant regulation of wholesale wire transfers anywhere in the
world."' 28 Yet within a few years after 4A was promulgated, forty-nine
states enacted it, the Federal Reserve System incorporated it into the fed-
eral wire-transfer regulations, private fund-transfer systems integrated it
into their rules, and the United Nations Committee embraced it. 2 9  In-
deed, various foreign governments, impressed with the UCC's success,
have considered adopting similar laws.
130
As well as being horizontally developed, the Code is also a perfect
example of a law that is tested horizontally. Courts in over fifty jurisdic-
tions interpret and fill in gaps in the Code. 31 With no formal or informal
system for refereeing among the sovereign state courts, each jurisdiction
is free to try its own approach to solving any given problem. 132  At the
373 (noting that while in some areas the UCC preserves existing business practices, in others the
provisions were new and imaginative); Cooter, supra note 26, at 1651-52 (observing that Karl
Llewellyn, the principle force behind the original UCC, "tried to identify and articulate the best
commercial practices in contemporary business communities"); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The
Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beau-
tiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1151-57 (1985) (observing that the UCC was in
many ways an improvement, not simply a codification, of business practices); Kamp, supra
note 112, at 327-29, 331-32, 393 (arguing that the UCC drafters wanted to discard "outmoded
ideas and practices" in order to modernize commercial law and that they downplayed the UCC's
reformist nature in order to secure state adoption); Wiseman, supra note 112, at 494-95 (noting
that Llewellyn's legal realism did not mean accepting all existing business practices, but instead
sought to impose "better" rules to foster a "better" reality).
127. Homer Kripke, The Importance of the Code, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 591, 594-95 (1990).
Other commercial law scholars concur. See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 41 (5th ed. 1993) (stating that Article 9 "represents the most significant single
unification effort in the history of modem American private law").
128. Ring, supra note 46, at 292; see also Felsenfeld, supra note 117, at 723.
129. See Ring, supra note 46, at 298-300. See also supra note 122.
130. See Peter Coogan, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 548-50 (1982).
131. In addition to the 50.states, the UCC has been adopted by the District of Columbia and
the Virgin Islands. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 125, § 1.
132. See McLaughlin, supra note 124, at 693-95. Within any one jurisdiction, the judicial
interpretation of the Code will be vertical in the sense that the state's supreme court will be the
final arbiter of the Code's meaning for that state. However, among the states there is a hori-
zontal testing in that each jurisdiction is free to accept or reject the result in another state. But
see Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 117, at 557-61 (proposing a single national commercial law).
The original drafters of the Code intended that courts interpret and apply the Code in light
of current business practices. See Danzig, supra note 123, at 624-26 (pointing out that key to
Karl Llewellyn's legal realism was the view that law unconsciously evolved with the mores of
society); Gedid, supra note 123, at 359, 363 (noting that UCC drafters saw law as dynamic and
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same time, there is an inevitable and exceedingly helpful cross-
fertilization among the various state courts as they observe and learn from
the decisions of other jurisdictions. 33 Thus, when one jurisdiction adopts
an interpretation that eventually leads to a morass, other states can see the
mistake and adopt a different interpretation. 134  Over time, a consensus
typically forms around one or two "better" solutions, and eventually a
drafting committee (again using a horizontal, participatory approach) pro-
poses amendments to the Code.
135
Despite its success, the UCC does suffer from some obvious weak-
nesses. First, the town-meeting approach to drafting takes years to pro-
duce a final product.136 Second, at times the need for uniformity among
the states can lead to a lowest-common-denominator solution to a problem
instead of a bold initiative. 37 Third, the UCC involves strictly commer-
reflecting social change, so that any equilibrium in the law was only temporary); Kamp, supra
note 112, at 336, 345-46, 388 (observing that the UCC drafters wanted flexible rules that would
be re-examined and changed as needed); Wiseman, supra note 112, at 493 (stating that Llewel-
lyn believed law constantly needs to be examined to see how it fits with the society it purports to
serve). See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norns, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-1815 (1996)
(suggesting that Llewellyn's belief that courts should use "immanent business norms" to decide
cases is not necessarily what business people want).
133. See, e.g., Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. App. 1977) (dis-
cussing three approaches courts have used in determining effect of insufficient notice of sale on
suit to recover deficiency judgment). Robert Cooter observes that judicial interpretation of the
UCC is akin to common law evolution. See Cooter, supra note 26, at 1652. See also infra Part
II.B.
134. See, e.g., Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 806 A.2d 806, 813 (N.J. 1984)
(declining to follow decisions of other state courts interpreting U.C.C. § 3-419(3)).
135. Amendments to the Code are made only after a period of such testing in the courts and
use of the Code in the marketplace. In that way the UCC drafting committee can assess the
Code's performance in light of actual business transactions and make any needed adjustments.
For instance, under the 1990 revisions to Article 3, a negotiable instrument may include a vari-
able interest rate. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1994). The prior version required payment of a
"sum certain." U.C.C. § 3-106 (1978). For a description of the revision process, see Overby,
supra note 115, at 653-54; Rogers, supra note 114, at 1445-47.
136. See Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 117, at 558 (noting that one problem with the UCC
is the time it takes to correct or update the law); Felsenfeld, supra note 117, at 763 ("Article 4A
is the product of some three and one-half years of work."); Rogers, supra note 114, at 1432,
1446-47 (reporting that revisions to Article 8 took six years); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity
and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 551 (1991) (noting that
revisions to Articles 3 and 4 took twelve years); Wiseman, supra note 112, at 467 (observing
that the original Code was the result of 20 years of work).
137. See Danzig, supra note 123, at 623, 628-29 (noting that the legal realism basis of the
UCC and the drafters' desire for wide-spread adoption can result in reaffirming "the predomi-
nant morals of the marketplace" and focusing too much on the "is" and losing sight of the
.ought"); Overby, supra note 115, at 684, 704-09 (stating that the need for uniform acceptance
by states accounts for some UCC drafting decisions); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 112, at 615-
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cial dealings between private parties and issues that seem less complex,
less political, and certainly less emotionally charged than discrimination
issues.138 Often UCC issues boil down to questions of money and of
which party will insure against a particular type of loss, 139 making those
issues amenable to "yes" or "no" answers. Either the first secured lender
prevails or the second; either the bank absorbs the loss for a forged
drawer's signature or the customer does. Moreover, in many instances
the Code's rules apply to merchants of equal bargaining strength, who are
involved in multiple business transactions and frequent negotiations, and
who often play opposite roles in different transactions." A buyer today
may be a seller tomorrow; the bank that acts as a depository bank in one
checking transaction may be the payor bank in the next. Thus, over time
a party is likely to encounter both the advantage and disadvantage of any
given rule. In contrast, the UCC drafters were unable to reach agreement
on certain high-voltage issues, notably consumer matters. 4' These limi-
28 (arguing that UCC drafting can be influenced by interest groups who are likely to support the
status quo or incremental changes); Warren, supra note 46, at 816-19 (recognizing that a limita-
tion of the UCC approach to rulemaking is that "great ideas" and "bold initiatives" can be lost).
138. See Overby, supra note 115, at 654, 675 (arguing that politics are largely kept out of
UCC drafting). Other commentators argue that, although some drafters saw the UCC as regu-
lating a non-political body of law, the Code actually does involve moral and ethical questions.
See Danzig, supra note 123, at 628-29; Wiseman, supra note 112, at 468, 505-06. See also
Patchel, supra note 112, at 92 (asserting that the UCC drafters' lack of political accountability is
one of it drawbacks).
139. See Donald J. Rapson, Loss Allocation in Forgery and Fraud Cases: Significant
Changes Under Revised Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 435, 435 (1991) ("The guiding prin-
ciple and rationale for the loss allocation rules of ... Articles 3 and 4 was said to be that loss
should be imposed upon the party best able ... to avoid the loss.").
140. See Danzig, supra note 123, at 622-23.
Commercial law ... deals with a subcommunity ('merchants'), whose members oc-
cupy a status position distinct from society at large, whose disputes are often resolved
by informal negotiation or in private forums, whose relationships tend to continue over
time rather than ending with the culmination of single transactions, and whose primary
rules derive from a sense of fairness widespread-if imprecisely defined-within the
commercial community.
Id.
141. See Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 117, at 559 (noting that even when consumers ex-
press their views at drafting meetings, the ultimate decision is made by commercial lawyers who
may not be sensitive to consumer issues); Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Consuner Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679, 699-719 (1991)
(describing areas in which consumers need more protection); Miller, supra note 112, at 412-14
(observing that consumer issues were deleted from the final versions of Articles 3 and 4 be-
cause, inter alia, different states had already developed different laws on these topics and, there-
fore, finding a uniform approach was difficult); Patchel, supra note 112, at 124 (suggesting that
the uniform laws process may be unable to accommodate consumer interests because of the de-
sire on the part of the drafters for state enactment); Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 125, at
143 (noting that drafting process for uniform laws may be biased toward business rather than
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tations of the UCC lead to consideration of other examples of horizontal
jurisprudence.
B. State Common and Statutory Law
State common and statutory law present other examples in which
horizontal jurisprudence is evident, but with instructive differences from
the UCC. State common law develops horizontally in that its rules tend to
reflect and change with the social mores of the times. This horizontal de-
velopment of state common law is obviously more limited than that of the
UCC in that judges cannot consult with all affected groups in the partici-
patory fashion of the UCC drafting committee. Instead, in making the
decisions that form the common law, judges hear only specific cases
brought by a relatively small subset of the public.142 Moreover, state
judges, like their federal counterparts, are likely to come predominantly
from white, male, middle-class, well-educated backgrounds and thereby
represent a rather narrow slice of societal experiences and perspectives. 143
consumer groups because of the cost of attending drafting sessions); Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 112, at 615-24 (arguing that banking lawyers on drafting committees do not consider con-
sumer point of view); Warren, supra note 46, at 812, 819-22 (noting that consumer fraud issues
have not been successfully codified in a uniform law because these issues tend to be local and
factually different in different parts of the country). But see James J. White, Work and Play in
Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089, 2093-2102 (1994) (arguing that consumer issues are
properly excluded from Article 9).
142. In particular, judges are limited to hearing directly from those challenging some rule
and those seeking to uphold it. See ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 11-18 (noting that courts are
limited by the type of cases brought, standing doctrines, precedent, available remedies, the
judge's expertise in a subject area, and a general reluctance of many judges to make significant
changes); Cooter, supra note 26, at 1693 (observing that while a judicial decision may be gen-
eral in scope, litigants typically have little regard for the social costs that inefficient rules impose
on others); Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GO. L.J. 583, 589-
92, 605-08 (1992) (noting that because a judge is limited to hearing litigated cases, courts never
hear cases involving parties who comply with an existing rule or cases involving parties who
cease disputed activity, and, in addition, evidence rules and doctrines of standing and mootness
further restrict the information a judge has about a rule's effect).
143. See Becker, supra note 55, at 455 (reporting that, as of 1991, women comprised only
2.8% of state trial judges, 5.5% of state intermediate appellate court judges, and 5.89% of state
supreme court justices); Resnik, supra note 55, at 1686, 1705 (noting that ihere is gender bias in
state courts as well as federal courts and that women are estimated to be about 8% of all state
court judges). See also Carl A. Auerbach, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: A Critique of
Eisenberg's The Nature of the Comnon.Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 557 (1991) (stating that
along with existing societal standards, judges do and should use their own criteria of justice in
developing the common law); Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and
From the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L.
Rv. 433, 449 (1992) (noting that judges inevitably use their own political and personal values
in deciding cases); Sadurski, supra note 40, at 340, 344-50 (arguing that judges inevitably
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Yet, society, above and beyond the individual litigants, certainly has an
indirect effect on the common law in that as it evolves and changes, the
common law inevitably reflects the social mores and conditions of the
time." 4Indeed, the capacity for such growth and modification as societal
needs evolve is a major hallmark and benefit of the common law sys-
tem. 45 To be sure, there is unlikely to be a single, monolithic societal
view on many issues, 146 and the precedential basis of common law im-
pedes change. 47 However, state judges, who often are elected'48 and who
should and do look at societal values in deciding cases, but at times the values deemed to be so-
cietal may be the views of the particular judge).
144. Many jurisprudence scholars have noted that the common law and judicial interpreta-
tions of statutes reflect the overall interests of society. As Guido Calabresi states:
Judges are, after all, either elected or appointed and ratified by elected officials. Their
manner of selection suggests that they can both discern and respond to the popular
will.... In seeking to apply [a common law] framework to new circumstances, each
judge inevitably brings to the task some sense of the majority that selected him or her
and some sense of what is right for the country.
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES, 93, 97 (1982). See also
MELvIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1-3 (1988); 3 ROSCOE POUND,
JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1959); Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights
Act Jurisprudence, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1409, 1428-30 (1993) (observing that state judges are gen-
erally responsive to the public perspectives); Bartlett, supra note 57, at 2560-67 (noting that
when a court strikes down a work rule, it is usually because the rule is out of step with accepted
social norms); Cooter, supra note 26, at 1649 (arguing that, "in common law systems, intensive
litigation alerts judges to the need to change the law"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1487 (1987) (noting that the common law
rules represent well-considered, modern consensus); Stanley Mosk, The Common Law and the
Judicial Decision-Making Process, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 36 (1988) (noting that the
common law expands and develops to keep up with advances and new conditions in society);
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 186 (1986) (arguing that common law premises
"could be, and no doubt would be... altered by the judges in response to changing perceptions
of public policy").
145. Some scholars argue that the common law is economically efficient because competi-
tion among litigants causes an unconscious evolution toward efficiency. See John C. Goodman,
An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 261
(1979); Posner, supra note 144, at 185. See also Cooter, supra note 26, at 1690-94 (arguing
that common law is efficient because the underlying social norms are efficient). But see
Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, The Efficiency of the Common Law Reconsidered,
14 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 157, 165-75 (1991) (arguing that the common law process is not
efficient).
146. It is, of course, a simplification to say that the common law reflects societal values be-
cause there is no single "society" with a single, consistent set of values and mores. Different
people have differing views and any one individual is likely to have some conflicting and incon-
sistent views. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 984 (noting that there is no monolithic "society"
with a single set of beliefs).
147. As Grant Gilmore pointed out, growth in the number of courts and in the number of
published opinions can lead to confused decisions or decisions in which courts only take small,
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deal with a greater number of cases than their federal counterparts,' 49 are
nonetheless going to sense and respond-even if slowly-to the general,
consensus view of the populace. 50 Thus, the state common law moved
from treating wives as chattel to considering them as full-fledged adults
entitled to sue for, among other things, lack of consortium.' Similarly,
cautious steps as opposed to making "bold and daring" innovations. See Gilmore, supra note
123, at 1041-45. Indeed, one of the purposes of the UCC was to supplement the common law,
which was seen as inefficient due to its reliance on individual cases. See Kamp, supra note 112,
at 334-35. See also Becker, supra note 3,- at 998 (arguing that "a system bound by prece-
dent.., and tradition is antithetical to change"); Minow, supra note 56, at 54-55 (noting that
typically the status quo is assumed to be natural and desirable and that changes to it need special
justifications); Preston, supra note 83, at 2307-09 (noting that because many of the early legal
decisions are founded on an individual judge's sense of the proper outcome, stare decisis can
perpetuate the male-bias in the law). But see Bartlett, supra note 3, at 307-08 (noting that
precedent leaves room for evolution and change); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and
the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 215, 217
(1994) (noting that, rather than viewing custom as static and efficient, one can see it as dynamic
in that customs can "disappear without being repealed and... change without being
amended").
148. See Stephen P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 725 (1995) (noting that in only twelve states are most judges
not elected); Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and
Practical Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 225 (1994) (citing statistics showing that 41 states use elections
for choosing or retaining judges and arguing that elected state judges are more responsive to the
will of the people than federal judges). See also Abrams, supra note 144, at 1425-30 (arguing
that elected state judges are less detached from public than non-elected federal judges). But see
Croley, supra, at 726-42 (arguing that having elected judges may be risky in that those judges
may be too responsive to public sentiment).
149. Commentators have debated whether federal judges are superior in quality to state
judges. Compare Neuborne, supra note 19, at 1121-22, and Burt Neubome, Parity Revisited:
The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 799 (1995) (arguing that,
with respect to constitutional issues, federal judges are more competent and perform at a higher
level than state judges), with Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 953, 958-61 (1991) (arguing that state courts should be assumed to be on parity with fed-
eral courts because, inter alia, there are 15 times as many state judges as federal judges; the
quality of states judges, like federal judges, varies from one jurisdiction to another and over
time; many state judges have taken the lead in developing doctrines on individual rights), and
Resnik, supra note 55, at 1700 (arguing that federal courts should not be assumed to be prefer-
able on women's issues over state courts). See also Akhil Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1509 (1990) (describing debate over
whether state courts should be considered on par with federal courts); Erwin Chemerinsky, Par-
ity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 239-80
(1988) (describing the debate and concluding that it is unresolvable).
150. See supra note 144. In some areas, such as the application of a "reasonable person"
test, a judge is necessarily required to consider community standards. See Sadurski, supra note
40, at 352 (noting that all courts must consider societal values in applying standards such as rea-
sonable care, unconscionability, common sense, prudence, and reasonableness).
151. This example is suggested by Mosk, supra note 144, at 35.
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the common law of torts responded to increased industrialization and dis-
tant sellers by eliminating requirements of privity. 52
State common law is also horizontally developed in the sense that
courts in fifty sovereign jurisdictions formulate the rules. Through pub-
lished opinions, there is a horizontal, cross-fertilization among jurisdic-
tions as the courts in one state learn from and build upon the successes
and failures in other states. 153
In the same way, state statutory law is also a form of horizontal
lawmaking. Not only do state legislators listen to and consult with their
constituents, but state legislators also act horizontally in the formulation
of laws insofar as they observe what has or has not worked in other juris-
dictions.154 Thus, we see a cross-fertilization of ideas on topics as diverse
as welfare rights, tobacco regulation, and criminal law.1
55
152. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1986). See also Drummonds, supra note 50, at
519 (noting that states, rather than the federal government, pioneered the use of criminal law in
cases involving workplace safety violations); Weber, supra note 148, at 229 ("Tort law is a field
in which [state] experimentation has been particularly fruitful.").
153. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329, 332 (1988)
(discussing the advantage of having both federal and state courts rule on the same issue and not-
ing that "[o]ne of the main advantages of an organic, interactive federal system is that the differ-
ent political units within that system may benefit from . . . each other's wisdom and experi-
ence").
154. As Justice Brandeis noted: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J., dissenting). Justice Holmes similarly referred to
"the making of social experiments ... in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states."
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Church, supra note
45, at 1084 ("Domination by the national government... limits opportunities for small-scale
experimentation by states to determine which of various . . . programs may work best.");
Drummonds, supra note 50, at 519 (giving examples of areas in which state laws were the mod-
els for later federal action); Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 125, at 187 (noting that "the best
solution" for the problem of inefficient and inconsistent state laws "may be more competition
among the states rather than more uniform laws" and that "one should be skeptical about the
production of law by any rulemaking elite"). See also Becker, supra note 3, at 1010 (arguing
that errors are easier to correct in a legislative arena than in the courts); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471,
515-17 (1994) (observing that, in the area of corporate law, Congress often fails to adjust exist-
ing laws to keep pace with legal and economic developments whereas states are likely to act
more quickly).
There is some horizontal jurisprudence in federal legislation in that Congress can learn
from state legislation and from legal initiatives in other countries. For instance, in attempting to
find an effective approach to health care in the U.S., commentators cite the results in other
countries. See, e.g., Richard A. Schieber et al., U.S. Health Expenditure Performance: An
International Comparison and Data Update, 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1 (1992). Similarly,
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Moreover, the multi-jurisdictional nature of state common and statu-
tory law also leads to horizontal law-testing. Just as these laws are devel-
oped by fifty sovereign jurisdictions who learn from one another, so too
are they interpreted, modified, and updated by fifty equally sovereign tri-
bunals, each of whom can consult and build upon opinions of other state
courts.
However, the horizontal testing of state common and statutory law is
somewhat different from that associated with the UCC. In most instances
of UCC interpretation, each state court is dealing with identical or near-
identical statutory language. In contrast, state common law is likely to be
less precise than the UCC rules and is likely to vary more from one juris-
diction to another, making the decisions of other jurisdictions less helpful.
So too, given the likely variance in the wording of state statutes, the
cross-fertilization in the interpretation of statutory law likely will be less
than that associated with'the UCC or even common law. 156 Yet, the non-
uniform nature of state common and statutory law is also an advantage.
First, without the need for uniformity, judges can mold state common and
statutory law to fit new situations much faster and more easily than a
committee can draft amendments to the UCC.'57 Second, given each
the debate over gun control in the U.S. frequently provokes discussion of the results of gun
control laws in Canada. See, e.g., John H. Sloan et al., Handgun Regulations, Crime, Assaults,
and Homicide: A Tale of Two Cities, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1256 (1988) (comparing handgun
regulations and violent crimes in Seattle, Washington, and Vancouver, British Columbia).
155. For instance, a gun buy-back program or an anti-smoking ordinance that succeeds in
one community may be copied by others. See, e.g., Michael J. Sniffen, Arrest Ratefor Juve-
niles Dropped in '95, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 1996, at A3 (noting that programs in various
states and cities for gun confiscations, gun buy-backs, and bounty programs have been important
in reducing the arrest rate of young people for violent crimes). With respect to anti-smoking
laws, see Eskridge, supra note 40, at 160-61 (noting that regulation of cigarette smoking is an
example of a "bottom up" movement that originated with the people who then pressed for gov-
ernment action); Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Politics of Antismoking Legislation, 18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 787, 788 (1993) (noting that, as of 1970, only fourteen states re-
stricted smoking in public places, but, by 1993, 45 states and the District of Columbia restricted
smoking in some manner and that over 480 counties or cities enacted anti-smoking ordinances,
some of which are more stringent than the corresponding state law).
156. See Gilmore, supra note 123, at 1045-46 (observing that courts are limited to the extent
that state legislatures write highly technical and detailed laws, as opposed to broad statutes that
allow judges more leeway to change the rules as conditions change).
157. See Cooter, supra note 26, at 1655 (noting that, to the extent common law is based on
custom, change can occur with more flexibility than with statutes). With respect to judicial in-
terpretation of statutes, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1017-61 (1989) (arguing that public values affect statutory interpre-
tations made by judges); Sadurski, supra note 40, at 344-50 (noting that courts inevitably reflect
more recent societal views when interpreting laws, and therefore a court may, through its stat-
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state's sovereignty, each has leeway to use innovative approaches to
solving a problem, as opposed to settling for a modest solution that will
appeal to other jurisdictions. 
158
This is not to say that state statutory or common law is a more ideal
form of jurisprudence than the UCC. The common law is limited by its
precedential basis and by the number and types of cases that are liti-
gated."5 9 With state legislation, although constituents may be heard, the
legislator (or, more likely, the aide) who drafts the bill may not be famil-
iar with the details of the industry or practice to be regulated.'l Moreo-
ver, the final law enacted may represent less a societal consensus on an
issue than simply raw political power on one side.1
61
Despite these weaknesses, state common and statutory law, like the
UCC, show that real progress can be achieved through a horizontal juris-
prudence that is open to experimentation, variation, and cross-
fertilization.
C. Negotiated Administrative Regulations
A relatively recent development-negotiated regulations in federal
agencies-offers yet other insights into the implementation of a horizontal
jurisprudence. 162 With negotiated regulations, the administrative agency
tory construction, update the substance of the law or broaden its scope to fill in gaps). With
respect to the UCC development, see supra note 135.
158. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 125, at 140-41 (observing that decentralized
lawmaking, as in state common law, normally will produce more innovative, experimental, and
numerous solutions to a problem than a uniform law does and suggesting that uniform law pro-
posals might appeal to the least innovative legislators). However, the precedent-based nature of
common law may serve as a deterrent to innovation. See supra note 147.
159. See supra notes 142 and 147.
160. See supra note 46.
161. See Fitts, supra note 45, at 1579-84 (noting that legislatures are coming under in-
creased criticism for being disproportionately influenced by special interest groups at the ex-
pense of the broader public interest); Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 125, at 175-79 (noting
that state laws may be superior to federal laws in that there is more experimentation and judicial
interpretation between states, but that federal lawmaking may have the advantage of reducing the
influence of business groups over consumer groups); Sunstein, supra note 31, at 29 (observing
that legislation today seems to be a "series of accommodations among competing elites").
162. Regulatory negotiation (sometimes referred to as "reg-neg") is described in STEPHEN
B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 345-46 (2d ed. 1992); Leah Haygood, Negotiated Rule Making: Challenges for Me-
diators and Participants, 20 MEDIATION Q. 78, 78-79 (1988); Popper, supra note 30, at 289-
310. See also Dennis Farney, Idaho Interest Groups, Locking Out Politicians, Hold Civilized
Talks on Future of the Wilderness, WALL ST. J., July 11, 1991, at A12 (describing successful
face-to-face negotiations between environmentalists and timber groups regarding lumbering is-
sues).
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does not simply issue regulations in a top-down fashion on the affected
parties. Rather, the agency announces its intention to develop rules in a
particular area and, much like UCC drafting, invites all interested parties
to participate.a Typically, the agency then decides which parties will
participate and conducts initial organizational meetings to set procedural
ground rules."l Thereafter, the various participants (usually numbering
twenty to twenty-five) and the agency representatives begin face-to-face
discussions. As with UCC drafting, the agency publishes the resulting
proposals, solicits comments, and works with the participants to modify
the final draft to reflect the concerns raised by the comments."
However, while horizontal in nature, negotiated regulations differ
from the UCC and common law in several key respects. First, they are a
relatively new phenomenon and therefore lack the proven track record of
UCC drafting and common law development. Second, the resulting
agency regulations are not horizontally tested to any large degree.
Rather, as with Title VII, the testing and interpretation of the regulations
is left largely to the federal judiciary."
At the same time, insofar as the development of rules is concerned,
the experience with negotiated regulations has been highly successful.167
Participating parties tend to focus squarely on concrete issues, consider
details whose importance a more removed rule maker might not appreci-
ate, 1 rank their concerns, and make tradeoffs of lesser issues for conces-
163. See Overby, supra note 115, at 657-58 (noting similarity between UCC drafting and
negotiated agency rulemaling).
164. See Haygood, supra note 162, at 78. Philip Harter describes the agency's role in the
negotiations as threefold. First, it "hires and pays the mediator and will frequently provide the
logistical support for the negotiations." Philip Harter, Regulatory Negotiation, 2 ADR REP. 80,
80 (1988). Second, the agency will typically "generate the data to be used in the discussions."
Id. Third, the agency will issue the final rule and "will have to act unilaterally if the negotia-
tions fall apart." Id. In this third role, as an interested party, the agency "occupies the seat of
the 800-pound gorilla." Id.
165. The process is described in Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 142-50. See
also authorities cited supra note 162.
166. With respect to judicial review of administrative regulations, see KENNErH C. DAvIs
& RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 11.1-11.5, 17.1-17.3 (1994).
167. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure For Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1,
38-42 (1982) (giving examples of successful negotiations of administrative regulations); Hay-
good, supra note 162, at 79-83 (giving examples of successful negotiated rulemaking at the
EPA); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 142-50 (describing successful negotiated rule-
maldng at the EPA). See also Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Beth Martin, FTfC Rulemaking Through
Negotiation, 61 N.C. L. REv. 275 (1983) (arguing in favor of negotiated rulemaling in the
FrC).
168. See Harter, supra note 167, at 30. See also Farney, supra note 162, at A12 ("Details
count for more than they would in far-off Washington. Environmentalists bargain for specific
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sions on points considered critical. 69 Furthermore, as with the UCC, the
negotiations allow parties "with a long history of harsh adversarial rela-
tions" to air differences, clarify issues, and narrow the areas of dispute.170
Additionally, the publication and circulation of drafts has proved a reli-
able means of insuring that all affected parties are able to and do partici-
pate. 171  Moreover, as with the UCC, "overarching all the other bene-
fits.., is the added legitimacy" that the resulting plan acquires."
Negotiated regulations also demonstrate that a consensual approach is
not necessarily hampered by the drawbacks associated with the UCC
drafting. Because negotiated regulations typically involve rather narrow
issues (as opposed to revamping the entire system of secured transac-
tions), the participants often produce a final draft within a few days or
weeks, despite sometimes bitter acrimony at the start of the process.'
73
trout streams. ... The timber industry knows the location of each sawmill and tries to protect
its future.").
169. See Harter, supra note 167, at 29-30, 50; Haygood, supra note 162, at 79 (noting that
negotiated regulations have been more pragmatic, participants come away with new information
and insights about the problems addressed, and negotiated rulemaking is easier and less costly in
the long run than agency-imposed regulations); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 151
(observing that, with negotiated rulemaking at the EPA, many participants "felt that the negoti-
ated outcome was far better than what they might have expected had they gone to court" and that
"the wisest possible rules had emerged"); Farney, supra note 162, at A12 (noting that negotia-
tions can lead "'to a higher level of creativity'"(quoting Richard Johnson, representative of the
,Sierra Club)). See also infra note 234 and accompanying text.
170. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 151, 159. See also Haygood, supra note
162, at 79 (noting that negotiated regulations tend to be more pragmatic than those asserted top
down by the agency and that participants obtain new information about the problems). In nego-
tiations regarding lumber issues, the parties found the same benefits came from the dialogue.
See Farney, supra note 162, at A12 ("'I'm discovering the timber industry is more responsive to
our needs than I ever thought . . . And they're discovering that I'm more sensitive to their
needs than they thought.'" (quoting Richard Johnson, representative of the Sierra Club)).
171. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 157.
172. Harter, supra note 167, at 30. As Harter notes, regardless of whether the horse under
design "ends up being a five-legged camel or a Kentucky Derby winner," the resulting rules will
have a validity beyond those developed by an agency and imposed top down on the parties. Id.
See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 152 (remarking, with respect to negotiated rule-
making at the EPA, "in the eyes of the participants ... negotiated rulemaking appeared to pro-
duce more legitimate outcomes at a lower cost"). See also Popper, supra note 30, at 289 (not-
ing that unanimous consent in negotiation may well mean a "lowest common denominator
result," but may also increase the likelihood of compliance and reduction of enforcement costs).
173. See e.g., New Developments, 3 BNA ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL. REP. 3-4 (1989)
(describing successful use of negotiated rulemaking in the Department of Agriculture and noting
that although participants originally thought they were "too far apart" to reach an agreement,
they did so within three days). See also Charan, supra note 26, at 108 (noting, in connection
with horizontal business structure, that when employees "identify real business problems, diag-
nose them together, and reach conclusions ... they become more skillful at making trade-offs,
and more trusting of one another").
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Furthermore, the fact that there are multiple issues, with few having
"yes" or "no" answers, has proven to be an advantage, rather than a det-
riment, because it allows a party to trade success on one issue for conces-
sions on another.174 The regulatory experience has also shown that fears
of perceived inequality of power and inexperience in negotiating are un-
warranted."7 Even parties who seemingly lacked political and numerical
power proved "[t]hey were... quite capable of holding their own in
[agency] negotiations" and "exerted substantial influence over the final
agreements."17 6
In sum, the UCC, state common and statutory law, and negotiated
agency regulations present concrete examples of horizontal jurisprudence
at work. No one of these experiences can or should be transplanted
wholesale into the sex discrimination area. Yet, taken together, these ex-
amples point the way to a new approach to employment issues.
IV. Injecting Horizontal Jurisprudence into Employment Issues
Although gender issues in the workplace seem a far cry from the
UCC, state common and statutory law, and federal administrative regula-
tions, an infusion of horizontal jurisprudence into the employment area
will nonetheless aid in finding solutions. Using a horizontal approach for
employment issues does not mean the enactment of a uniform gender-in-
employment law. Title VII already tries to provide one-size-fits-all rules.
Adding a horizontal approach as a supplement to (rather than a replace-
ment of) Title VII means encouraging a horizontal development and test-
ing of a variety of strategies for dealing with issues of gender in the
workplace. In particular, with respect to developing strategies, it means:
174. See Harter, supra note 167, at 50 (observing that negotiations tend to work better when
there are multiple issues to trade and few "yes" or "no" answers because a party can yield on
issues that have lower priority to improve its position on higher-priority issues); Susskind &
McMahon, supra note 116, at 152 (noting that successful negotiated environmental rulemaking
demonstrates that having "a large enough range of issues or options to allow trade-off or crea-
tive packaging" is beneficial). Thus, on several occasions, the Environmental Protection
Agency has found negotiated rulemaking successful, in part precisely because the issues were
polycentric in the sense of generating a large number of views and many interested groups. See
Harter, supra note 167, at 40-42.
175. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 154, 157 (observing that the perceived
inequality of power and inexperience in negotiations of environmental groups did not prove det-
rimental to successful negotiated rulemaking at the EPA).
176. Id. at 154. See also Harter, supra note 167, at 45 (noting that there are numerous
sources of power for purposes of negotiations, including a party's ability to go to court if nego-
tiations fail, the uncertainty of a judicial outcome, the ability to inflict costs and delays on the
other side through litigation, and the ability to go to the media).
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* acknowledging the diversity among employers, employees, and
workplace situations and focusing on specific problems in specific jobs at
specific workplaces;
& involving as many people and as many different viewpoints as pos-
sible in creating strategies to deal with these problems and, in particular,
encouraging the people directly affected-managers and employees,
women and men, persons of all races and job categories-to participate in
the planning process;
e allowing different firms and employees to devise different tactics to
deal with issues;
e trying different fora, not just federal courts and Congress, to effect
change and, in particular, working on prevention and in-house dispute
resolution procedures as alternatives to litigation.
With respect to testing strategies, it means:
* encouraging workers and firms to learn from the successes and
failures of other firms;
* revising "solutions" over time as circumstances change;
* accepting some complete or partial failures and even admitting that
some problems may not be solvable at this time.
To flesh out this proposal, let me repeat that I am not proposing the
repeal of Title VII or other federal civil rights laws. The vertical ap-
proach of Title VII has certain advantages: it provides a uniform set of
minimum rules and protections; it may hasten firms to take steps that, in
the long term, would come about through market forces; it may increase
women's self-esteem and encourage more women who want to enter the
workforce to do so; it may help galvanize women to work together on
employment and other issues.177
My proposal is to add a horizontal jurisprudential approach as a
complement to the current, largely vertical Title VII. In doing so, em-
ployees would simply acknowledge the differences among themselves,
their views, and the employment situations they face, as well as acknowl-
edging that by itself, no one-size-fits-all set of rules can solve all gender
disputes in the workplace.178 Indeed, the beauty of a horizontal approach
177. See authorities cited supra note 58.
178. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. See also Abrams, supra note 66, at
1192 (contending that a single comprehensive principle of antidiscrimination law is unnecessary
because different analyses may be better suited to combat different instances of discrimination);
Minow, supra note 103, at 64 (observing that women need to recognize that just as there is di-
versity among women, so too there can be no one, single feminist method); Radin, supra note 3,
at 1718 (arguing that feminism should not seek to find one overarching conception or set of
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is that it takes advantage of the very diversity of viewpoints and situations
that makes these issues appear so intractable.179 It encourages all employ-
ees to participate in developing individualized plans to handle the particu-
lar problems presented at their workplaces. Thus, ,like the UCC and ne-
gotiated administrative regulations, it allows strategies to develop from
the bottom up, rather than being imposed from the top down. 8° Moreo-
ver, by including many voices in the drafting stage, any resulting plan is
likely to be both more workable and more acceptable to employers and
employees, both men and women. 8
principles); Rhode, supra note 4, at 1189-90, 1196 (arguing that the diversity among women,
women's views, and harassment and discrimination supports the use of a contextual approach
with a range of solutions in any given circumstance); Stein, supra note 90, at 1189-90 (arguing
that women may need to use different arguments and approaches for different problems).
179. Disagreement among women may be healthy for the advancement of women's issues.
As Angela Harris notes, we may be better off "living with dissensus," i.e., acknowledging and
accepting the conflicts and tensions among various feminist theories. Harris, supra note 15, at
744. See also R. Lea Brilmayer, Inclusive Feminism, 38 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 377 (1993) (ob-
serving that when a few feminists try to control feminism, the majority of women stop identify-
ing themselves as feminists); Cain, supra note 5, at 845-46 (suggesting that women need to lis-
ten to one another); Crenshaw, supra note 56, at 154-55 (noting need to consider experiences of
women of all races); Ehrenreich, supra note 73, at 1204 (arguing that consensus often causes us
to disregard diversity); Harris, supra note 12, at 610-15 (observing that, by acknowledging the
differences among them, women can strengthen their movement); Minow, supra note 103, at
62-64 (asserting that feminism needs conflicting theories); Cheryl B. Preston, It Moves, Even If
We Don't: A Reply to Arthur Austin, The Ten Top Politically Correct Law Reviews, 63 TENN.
L. REv. 735, 740-41 (1996) (contending that seeking universal consensus on rules may daunt
creativity); Rhode, supra note 56 at 1789-90 (noting the need to use the differences among
women to enrich analysis and broaden coalitions). A chief critic of Title VII, Richard Epstein,
echoes the same view: "Consensus" may be "dangerous for intellectual work. It makes intel-
lectuals comfortable, soft, perhaps even a little complacent." EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 6.
180. See Becker, supra note 3, at 997 ("Rleal change in the relationship between the sexes
is unlikely without change at the grass-roots level. Decisions from on high are unlikely to trans-
form intimate relationships."); Crain, supra note 4, at 1938 ("Mobilizing working women
around ... concrete issues is more likely to be successful than.., consciousness-raising strate-
gies."); Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Oitical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 344-48 (1987) (noting that by including the ideas of those on
the "bottom," such as the victims of discrimination, a movement can obtain added ideas and
force); Radin, supra note 3, at 1721 (suggesting a pragmatic approach as a way for feminists to
move from concepts to legal realities); Rhode, supra note 56, at 1793 (arguing that women
need to become more contextual in devising solutions to problems). See also EPSTEIN, supra
note 52, at 273 (arguing that it is risky to impose a centralized and comprehensive world view
on employment markets); Farney, supra note 162, at A12 (comparing the failure of two power-
ful politicians to reach a decision on wilderness issues with the success of face-to-face negotia-
tions between environmental and timber interests).
181. The critics of Title VII and many feminists are beginning to agree on this point. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 274 (arguing that the risk of major social dislocation is greater when
programs are instituted from "without," as opposed to being developed by employees and man-
agers); Greene, supra note 4, at 1262-63 (stressing the need for women to work with men to
find solutions, particularly in light of the current male domination of institutions of power);
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However, while the use of a horizontal development of strategies
will, like the UCC and negotiated regulatory drafting, encourage people
with different views to work out plans for dealing with particular issues
facing them, the result will be the opposite of a uniform code of conduct
or single set of regulations. The result will be more akin to state common
or statutory law in that each firm will be free, within the general contours
of applicable laws, to devise its own tactics for solving the particular gen-
der issues it faces.' 82 Thus, as with state laws, "solutions" will vary from
one employer to another. Employees and managers in a small manufac-
turing plant in the Midwest may develop rules different from those im-
plemented in a Wall Street brokerage house. Indeed, a large company
and its employees may develop different rules for different types of work-
Levit, supra note 56, at 1107-08 ("Part of the answer may lie in feminists extending an open
invitation to men to participate in dialogue. Inclusion of majority group members may diffuse
misconceptions and resentment, as well as help to avoid political and social backlash."); Minow,
supra note 103, at 58-60 (noting that a powerful device to expose and challenge unstated as-
sumptions and the status quo is to look at an issue from another person's point of view and
thereby see the partiality of one's own perspective); Preston, supra note 83, at 2341, 2345 (ar-
guing that feminists need to invite everyone "to join in a non-threatening dialogue" and noting
that "[flor feminists, as any moral- and ethics-based reform movement, coming to others willing
to receive as well as to teach is a laudable principle worth striving to attain"). See also Baren-
berg, supra note 42, at 1493 (noting that worker participation in rule-development enhances
commitment to the resulting decisions); Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1819, 1873 (1992) (noting that a more participatory, decentralized structure in
labor unions gives workers a sense of self-esteem, a feeling that they can affect their own lives
and a lessened sense of isolation); Ring, supra note 46, at 303 (noting, in a discussion of the
UCC drafting, that to the extent interested and knowledgeable parties are shut out of the drafting
process, suspicion and resentment rise, and people are forced into advocacy roles rather than
being co-searchers for a solution); Stephanie N. Mehta, Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11,
1996, at R12 (noting that many companies find diversity plans are more successful if senior
managers consult with subordinates early in the process and invite them to help establish goals).
182. Not only will a firm have to work within Title VII and the other civil rights laws, it
will also have to avoid violating § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relation Act, which makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or admini-
stration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(2) (1973 & Supp. 1996). The act defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." Id. § 152(5). The purpose of § 8(a)(2) was to permit the development of collective
bargaining by precluding employers from forcing employees to join management-dominated
.company unions." For a discussion of § 8(a)(2), see, for example, Barenberg, supra note 42,
at 1392-1430. Some commentators argue that Congress should repeal § 8(a)(2) because it dis-
courages communication between employers and employees. See Shaun G. Clark, Note, Re-
thinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2),
96 YALE L.J. 2021 (1987); Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Decon-
struction, 33 B.C. L. REv. 481, 531 (1992).
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ers. The problems faced by women and men in a firm's factory may be
substantially different from those faced by the firm's office workers."'
Even within the same industry, workers at different employers may face
differing situations, so the solutions devised at one firm may differ some-
what from those agreed upon at a competing company. Further, even if
the problems are largely the same at the two finrns, different groups of
managers and employees may devise different strategies for attacking the
problems."i
This lack of uniformity is not a cause for alarm. One of the
strengths of a horizontal jurisprudential approach is the testing by differ-
ent entities of diverse approaches to solving a problem. Nor should peo-
ple be dismayed because some of the "solutions" fail utterly. Inevitably,
some plans will fail, but others will succeed, at least in part. With still
other strategies, their success may change over time as the circumstances
in a firm or industry change.es' As with the horizontal testing of the UCC
and state common law, employers and employees can learn from and
build upon their own successes and failures, as well those of other
183. Cf. Delgado, supra note 3, at 657 (noting that a small subgroup may do better dealing
with problems on its own rather than aligning with a large group). Indeed, scholars note that the
town-meeting approach to lawmaking works only where there are small groups. See Magleby,
supra note 32, at 16.
184. Some feminists have begun looking outside the United States for possible strategies for
solving U.S. employment issues. See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1256-58, 1280-83 (noting that,
rather than stressing individual fault-finding and litigation for sexual harassment, Europeans re-
gard harassment as a collective harm to health, safety, and worker dignity and emphasize pre-
vention and informal in-house complaint resolution procedures); Issacharoff & Rosenblum, su-
pra note 60, at 2200-14 (looking to the European solutions for dealing with pregnancy leave).
See generally Earle & Madek, supra note 61, at 69-78 (comparing sexual harassment laws of
various countries); Margaret Y.K. Woo, Biology and Equality: Challenge for Feminism in the
Socialist and the Liberal State, 42 EMORY L.J. 143 (1993) (discussing Chinese laws. relating to
women in the workplace).
185. Deborah Rhode outlines how, historically, the arguments used by feminists have
changed as their goals changed. For instance, the early feminists relied on sex-based differences
as a rationale for the enactment of protective laws limiting women's work hours. As Rhode
points out, whether such protective laws did more harm than good (by protecting women out of
the best jobs) depends on which women are considered, which time period is analyzed, and what
trade-offs one is willing to make. See Rhode, supra note 56, at 1738-41. See also Becker, su-
pra note 3, at 991 (noting the need for experimentation is "particularly high in an area like [sex-
ual] equality... in which.there is no consensus about what a world with sexual equality would
look like let alone agreement on the means to get there" and that women may need a complex
mixture of approaches and different mixtures at different times); Levit, supra note 56, at 1050
("[Knowledge, rather than consisting of objective, timeless truths, is situational and constructed
from a confluence of multiple perspectives."); Radin, supra note 3, at 1704 (noting that the
same problem may demand different solutions at different times).
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firms.186 Eventually, as different firms experiment with different plans,
there will be a cross-fertilization of ideas and a gradual movement toward
the better-working strategies.187 Furthermore, while some failures are in-
evitable with a horizontal approach, these missteps will be easier to cor-
rect than those arising in a vertical system. Employees and firms can
modify a malfunctioning program at a single plant in short order com-
pared to the time, expense, and energy required to convince the Supreme
Court or Congress to act on a Title VII issue.
88
186. See Bartlett, supra note 101, at 864 (noting that trial and error is central to feminist
methodology); Becker, supra note 3, at 990 (arguing that "a top-down judicially-enforced ap-
proach to equality" may be inconsistent with the experimentation needed for success); Bernstein,
supra note 2, at 1293, 1304 (arguing that sexual harassment problems need pluralistic solutions,
innovation, flexibility, and a trial and error approach); Karst, supra note 12, at 477 (observing
that an important freedom is "the freedom to make serious mistakes"); Preston, supra note 83,
at 2322 ("We learn from others' successes and from their mistakes, less painfully than from our
own."); Carol Sanger, Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl of the Petals, 27 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 225, 245 (1993) (noting that feminists continue to rethink and refine their theories); Ann
Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 29 (1992) ("Finding
the best answer for now means to generate as many options as possible .... The crucial
idea ... is that any option chosen can be provisional.").
187. The proposal for a horizontal jurisprudential approach has some similarities to pragma-
tism and legal realism in recognizing the contextual aspect of rules and the need to revise rules
as conditions change. See Becker, supra note 3, at 990 (observing that a pragmatist "considers
it unlikely that human beings can divine the best solutions to complex issues in the abstract, us-
ing top-down theories, rather than through experimentation"); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 805-06 (1989) (describing pragmatism); Gary
Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 637 (1989) (noting
the similarity between feminist movement and legal realism); Radin, supra note 3, at 1707
("Pragmatism and feminism ... share ... the commitment to finding knowledge in the par-
ticulars of experience[,] ... a commitment against abstract idealism, transcendence, founda-
tionalism, and atemporal universality; and in favor of immanence, historicity, concreteness,
situatedness, contextuality, embeddedness, [and] narrativity of meaning."); Singer, supra note
123, at 474 (observing that the legal realist wants "to replace formalism with a pragmatic atti-
tude toward law" and regards legal principles as "social constructs, designed by people in spe-
cific historical and social contexts for specific purposes to achieve specific ends"). However,
Katharine Bartlett notes that feminist practical reasoning is somewhat different from legal real-
ism in that legal realism sees rules as incapable of covering all factual situations, whereas femi-
nist practical reasoning sees unbending rules as undesirable as well as impracticable. See
Bartlett, supra note 101 at 853-58. See also Scales, supra note 90, at 1400 (describing similari-
ties and differences between feminism and legal realism).
188. With respect to the difficulty of legislatively overriding a Supreme Court decision, see
MARSHALL, supra note 39, at 167; Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for
an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 184-96 (1989); Philip S.
Runkel, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Continuation of the Wards Cove Standard of
Business Necessity?, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177, 1187-1200 (1994) (describing the time
and negotiations necessary to enact a civil rights law overruling certain Supreme Court rulings).
With respect to the Supreme Court's reluctance to overrule its own decisions, see Marshall, su-
pra, at 181 (noting the Court is generally reluctant to overrule precedents construing statutes).
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Women may also find that they can use fora or activities outside the
workplace per se to develop strategies that aid them in employment situa-
tions and in their legal battles. For instance, women may find that work
with labor unions,'89 with community groups,"9 with state and municipal
legislative bodies,' 9' or utilizing extra-legal tactics (such as boycotts) yield
benefits."9 As scholars have long recognized, law and society are inexo-
rably intertwined, and changes in social attitudes often come before or
along with successful legal change."9n For instance, Brown v. Board of
Education,19' one of the hallmark civil rights cases, was part of a larger
sea of change in social attitudes and economic and political forces."9 So
See also Becker, supra note 3 at 989-90 (noting that definite legal standards can hurt women
because they can be difficult to change).
189. See Cran, supra note 181, at 1866 (arguing that an alliance between feminists and la-
bor unions could help revitalize unions); Rhode, supra note 56, at 1779-80 (suggesting that
women should work more in collective bargaining and legislative lobbying because courts may
not be the ideal forum for all women's issues). See also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1285-86
(observing that in Europe there is greater involvement by trade unions in sexual harassment
complaints).
190. See, e.g., Crain, supra note 4, at 1918 (observing that many women receive significant
satisfaction in working with community groups).
191. See Becker, supra note 3, at 1002-12 (arguing that women may have greater success in
legislatures than in courts).
192. See Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law and Implementation: A Clinical
Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 83, 103-05 (1989) (describing use
of extra-legal tactics in the civil rights movement, such as school strikes, sit-ins, freedom rides
and boycotts); David Southwell, Jackson, NOW Push on with Mitsubishi Boycott, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, July 24, 1996, at 20 (citing national boycott of Mitsubishi to urge firm to settle harass-
ment lawsuits and increase opportunities for women and minorities). See also Linda R.
Hirshman, Sex and Money: Is Law School a Dead End Street for Women?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
1252, 1271 (1993) (suggesting that women may be able to change hiring and admission policies
at colleges and universities by tying donation money to women's issues and scholarships). With
respect to the limits of societal views on judicial decisions, see authorities cited supra note 104.
193. See Abrams, 7itle VI, supra note 5, at 2531-37 (observing that employment discrimi-
nation must be seen as part of larger social patterns); Bartlett, supra note 57, at 2560-68 (noting
that, in applying discrimination laws, courts tend to build upon, not challenge, community
norms and concluding that women cannot create an effective approach to workplace problems
apart from community norms); Freedman, supra note 4, at 965 (commenting that sexual patterns
and differences are deeply embedded in social, economic and political structures and into a per-
son's sense of self); Greene, supra note 4, at 1263 (noting that law "is embedded in dense social
matrix and.., legal change may depend on changes in that matrix").
194. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
195. Although commentators disagree about the significance of the Brown decision by itself,
they agree that Brown must be viewed as part of a larger social mosaic. A multitude of forces
were at work and contributed to the Supreme Court's decision, and much was left to be done
after the decision to achieve desegregation. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTIcE 126-314,
748-78 (1976) (describing social, economic, and political factors leading up to the Brown deci-
sion and civil rights movement after Brown); ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 72-106, 157-74
(describing social conditions before and after Brown); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
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too, in addition to legal victories, women can affect their position in the
job market by addressing community standards and working for bottom-
up social change."
The suggestion that a horizontal approach be injected into employ-
ment issues will, no doubt, generate skepticism. Needless to say, there
are significant differences between issues of gender equality in the work-
place and commercial and common law questions. For instance, although
both employment issues and the UCC involve dealings between private
parties, issues of gender in the workplace are more complex and more
emotionally charged than UCC issues.' 97 In sex discrimination cases,
there are not only financial considerations, but also concerns for worker
dignity, personal fulfillment, and, in some sense, morality.1 98 Conse-
quently, the question of who bears the loss for check fraud is unlikely to
generate the type of heated debate that arises when the issue is hiring or
RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 at 150-86, 232-
71 (1994) (describing the background work of the NAACP and Thurgood Marshall in Brown
and the public resistance to the Brown decision); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 98, at 553-58
(arguing that the Brown decision had little effect because social practices and attitudes had not
changed sufficiently); Eskridge, supra note 40, at 143-48 (noting that the Brown decision repre-
sented years of work by African Americans and is a prime example of law percolating from the
bottom up); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7, 13-71 (1994) (describing the social, political, and economic changes that pre-
ceded the Brown ruling). See also David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist
Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 153-55 (1994) (arguing that
although Brown was not the "inaugural event" of the civil rights movement, it served an impor-
tant function in inspiring the movement); Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of
Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173, 173-77 (1994) (arguing that although Brown's importance has
been overestimated, it did serve to establish a fundamental principle of constitutional law).
For a description of what happened "behind the scenes" in the Supreme Court in Brown,
see generally Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991).
196. See Becker, supra note 3, at 1003 (observing that "women have achieved many of their
most significant legal changes in fora other than courts"); Eskridge, supra note 40, at 159 (not-
ing that judicial decisions in the 1970s reflected much of the women's political movement and as
well as social economic changes); Matsuda, supra note 180, at 349 ("[S]ince legal scholars will
never be the center of any successful movement for social change ... we must build coalitions
with others."). See also McDougall, supra note 192, at 109-10 (describing the successful "web
of relationships" used in the civil rights movement that connected lobbying, policymaking, pri-
vate organizations, unions, and churches as opposed to dependence solely on "lawyer elitism").
197. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
198. See Crain, supra note 82, at 567 (noting that feminists seeking equality in employment
are making a moral argument); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., The Message of Affirmative Action, in
REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 108, 120-27 (1991) (discussing affirmative action as a moral issue);
Preston, supra note 83, at 2344-45 (referring to feminism as a moral and ethics-based move-
ment); Sunstein, supra note 58, at 2429-34 (discussing race and sex discrimination as partly
moral questions); Rhode, supra note 4, at 1197 (noting that opposition to affirmative action is
based on both moral and practical grounds).
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promoting more women, pregnancy leave, or child care. Furthermore,
especially in areas such as sexual harassment, there are strong overtones
of fault-finding in employment issues t99 that are not present in commercial
law. °
Moreover, unlike commercial transactions, relations between em-
ployers and employees (or potential employees) are not typically dealings
between parties of equal bargaining strength.20 1 Rather, in gross gener-
alities, the workplace can be seen as an area in which one group (usually
men) has control and a vested interest in keeping the status quo, while an-
other, far less powerful group (women) seeks changes. 2  Ul-ike the de-
velopment of the UCC, where most parties saw the benefit of change,'
managers of firms may see little reason to modify the status quo regarding
employment practices. With little bargaining power, women may find
themselves agreeing to codification of existing practices (which effectively
199. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
200. Fault-finding in the UCC context is limited to a few situations in which liability rests
on the party best able to avoid the loss. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-405(b) (1994).
201. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. As Michael Fitts notes, in discussing leg-
islative theory, true dialogue presumes a system of equals, with each person capable of having
her position accepted. See Fitts, supra note 45, at 1618.
202. Not only are many work standards designed by men, see authorities cited supra note
93, but men disproportionately occupy positions of power within firms, see Abrams, supra note
66, at 1204 (observing that women tend to occupy the lower rungs of most professional hierar-
chies); Epstein, supra note 61, at 429-30 (noting that although women constitute almost half of
the workforce, "their recent entry into many fields means that most of them hold jobs that fall in
the low range of the professional hierarchy, with men occupying the vast majority of supervisory
and managerial positions"); Larson, supra note 104, at 1255 (noting that women are underrepre-
sented in political bodies and centers of economic and intellectual power); Paetzold & Gely, su-
pra note 11, at 1526-27 (noting the difficulty women and minorities have in moving to top man-
agement positions); Radford, supra note 11, at 483-84 (noting difficulty of women in moving
into positions of corporate power); Resnik, supra note 5, at 1942 (noting that women often meet
their adversaries as unequals); David D. Kirkpatrick, Women Occupy Few Top Jobs, A Study
Shows, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1996, at B16A (reporting that women make up 10% of the offi-
cers at the largest U.S. companies and an average of just 2% of the senior executive positions);
Melissa Schorr & Lisa Kalis, Corporate Boards: The Way They Still Are, 20 WORKING
WOMAN 11 (1995) (reporting that, as of 1995, 40% of the Fortune 1000 corporate boards did
not have any female directors and that, overall, women occupy 6.9% of the 11,790 board seats
of those companies). In addition, my proposal has the drawback of requiring women to bear the
initial onus of asking for change in the status quo. See Preston, supra note 83, at 2343 (noting
risk of overburdening women with the primary responsibility for persuasion but also recognizing
that there is no other realistic approach at present).
203. At the time the UCC was originally drafted, merchants recognized that the Uniform
Sales Act, which was based on 19th century commerce, was woefully obsolete. See Wiseman,
supra note 112, at 472-77.
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treat the male perspective as the norm) or settling for relatively modest
gains that then become solidified into workplace rules.'
Additionally, by focusing on pragmatic steps to ameliorate specific
problems, women may lose sight of bold ideas and initiatives.' °5 Even
worse, some of the small steps that are achieved may be inconsistent with
the larger goals of the women's movement' and may disperse what
power women do have.2" Furthermore, because the public may link an
issue's "importance" to its being subject to federal regulation, some
women may fear that they will diminish the significance of gender-
discrimination issues by relegating them to the community and individual-
employer level.0 8
In addition, finding an acceptable solution in the employment dis-
putes is often highly complex. Unlike UCC issues, where frequently
"yes" and "no" answers are possible,' there are few bipolar issues or
remedies in the area of sex discrimination in the workplace. Even as-
suming agreement on the proposition that having more women in a spe-
cific position would be beneficial, such agreement tells us nothing about
how to go about achieving this goal.210 Similarly, while few people would
defend sexual harassment, reasonable minds can differ about such issues
as how to define it, the plaintiffs appropriate burden of proof, permissi-
204. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; Bartlett, supra note 57, at 2568 (warning
that women need to guard against assuming that existing community norms are gender neutral);
Minow, supra note 56, at 65-66 (noting that, by playing under the existing rules, women risk
becoming tokens and accepting male perspectives); Preston, supra note 83, at 2343 ("Feminists
must resist becoming co-opted, inordinately diluted, or transmuted into puppets of the very sys-
tems we seek to change."). See also Sunstein, supra note 31, at 45 (noting that legislative
stalemates typically protect existing wealth).
205. See Radin, supra note 3, at 1708-11, 1721 (noting that a pragmatic approach may be
dangerous for women in that it can lead to conservatism). An historical example is provided by
Deborah Rhode who notes that the early 20th century feminist movement focused single-
mindedly on getting the vote and ignored racial injustices and the broader social and economic
constraints on women. However, Rhode also admits that had the women attacked the broader
issues, they risked division, diluted energies, and delay in getting the vote. See Rhode, supra
note 56, at 1741-42.
206. See Preston, supra note 179, at 738-39 (noting that using past practices as the starting
place for reasoning can impede improvements).
207. See Fitts, supra note 45, at 1635-37 (discussing effect of dispersion of power in a leg-
islative setting).
208. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 55, at 1699-1700 (arguing that the refusal of federal
courts to get involved in domestic issues marginalizes women and their problems). But see
Becker, supra note 3, at 1011 (arguing that, by seeking relief from the Supreme Court, women
have foregone experimentation on issues).
209. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 4, 5, and 64 and accompanying text.
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ble defenses, vicarious liability for the employer, and the appropriate
remedy.
211
Along with these critiques is the observation that promoting in-
creased dialogue on any subject is platitudinous but often unproductive.212
As Steven Smith wryly notes, the suggestion of increased discussion on an
issue is the "all-purpose elixir of our time. "213 Moreover, any negotiation
can deteriorate into a struggle among self-interested groups, and if some
groups (for instance, the lower-paid workers) are not adequately repre-
sented, any dialogue that does occur will be incomplete and result in only
211a partial solution.
Certainly, there is a good deal of legitimacy in these concerns.
Women need to guard against simply ratifying the status quo or settling
for inconsequential gains. They also need to be alert for "discussions" in
which negotiations are ongoing, but which never produce meaningful
progress or lead to strategies which target only elite professionals.
25
Furthermore, no one believes that gender issues will magically disappear
if workers and management just join hands and sing It's a Small World or
Hakuna Matata.
211. See supra notes 71-76, 85, and 86 and accompanying text.
212. As Philip Harter observes, one must be careful not "to fall into a 'hot tub' view" that
assumes that "if only we strip off the armor of an adversarial hearing, everyone will jump into
negotiations with beguiling honesty and openness to reach the optimum solution to the problem
at hand." Harter, supra note 167, at 31.
213. Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 435 (1990). Smith
is also critical of calls for solutions based in actual experience. He notes that no one wants a
body of principles divorced from experience, but to be helpful, raw data must be compartmen-
talized into theories and rules. See id. at 424-31. However, Katharine Bartlett points out that in
emphasizing contextual reasoning, feminists are not opposing all deductive approaches but are
acknowledging the diversity in human experience and the value of taking into account competing
or inconsistent claims. See Bartlett, supra note 101, at 855-57.
214. See Fitts, supra note 45, at 1639-40 (discussing problem of poor being left out of leg-
islative discussions); Lucie E. White, On the 'Consensus" to End Welfare: Where Are the
Women's Voices?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 843, 84451 (1994) (reporting the failure to include
women, and, particularly poor women, in discussions regarding welfare reform). See also Rib-
stein & Kobayashi, supra note 125, at 147-50 (noting that although the UCC has been highly
successful, other uniform law drafting may give undue benefit to special interest groups);
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 112, at 610 (same).
Indeed, to the extent the creation of a dialogue process involves the construction of new
procedural rules, elite workers and employers may gain an advantage with their ability to navi-
gate through any new procedures. See Fitts, supra note 45, at 1620-21 (discussing the effect of
more procedures in the legislative setting); Sunstein, supra note 31, at 76 (noting that in the
legislative context, deliberation can slow down social change and strengthen the status quo).
215. As Philip Harter notes, human nature's tendency to procrastinate is one of the imper-
fections of negotiated settlements. See Harter, supra note 167, at 47.
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Valid though these concerns are, they ought not be magnified to the
extent of wholly excluding a horizontal approach. Without discussions
within firms about specific problems, fewer changes will occur. Verti-
cally ordered change, whether emanating from the Supreme Court or
Congress, is sporadic and unpredictable, and frequently meets with resis-
tance and backlash.2 6 By supplementing such vertical movement with
non-threatening discussions in workplaces, women can concentrate on
concrete issues and obtain proactive changes to defuse the specific prob-
lems they are facing. In the employment arena in particular, each em-
ployer presents a somewhat different audience, with different needs and
different work arrangements. Just as UCC drafting, the common law,
and negotiated regulations focus on specific factual situations, women
(and men) enhance their likelihood of success by tailoring their discus-
sions to meet particular employment arrangements.1 7 Certainly women
will have to compromise on some matters, but compromise is inevitable,
whether women seek the aid of Congress, the courts, or individual em-
ployers. 21 8 Similarly, different results-ranging from "glowing success"
216. See authorities cited supra notes 104 and 188. See also Harter, supra note 167, at 28,
59 (noting that negotiated rulemaking is often less expensive and time consuming than seeking
government action).
217. As Cheryl Preston notes, in seeking change, feminists "must be sensitive to cultural
differences and nuances. They must understand the audience they are trying to reach." Preston,
supra note 83, at 2340 (footnotes omitted). See also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 1293-98 (argu-
ing that allowing firms to write their own standards with respect to sexual harassment would
likely lead to a greater commitment to those standards, rules responsive to the actual needs of
the particular firm, a relative ease in changing the rules when necessary, and an actual reduction
in sexual harassment and litigation); Stein, supra note 90, at 1189 ("[O]ne type of argument may
be more appropriate and effective in particular fora, while other types . . . may appeal to other
audiences.").
One hopes that, as discussions progress, previously antagonistic parties will build a sense of
trust toward one another. See Charan, supra note 26, at 112 ("A horizontal network
must... share openly and simultaneously each member's experiences, successes, and problems,
soft information that can't be captured in databases and spreadsheets and that remains hid-
den ... in most traditional organizations. This is the kind of sharing that builds trust, empathy,
and secure relationships."); Ghoshal & Bartlett, supra note 26, at 93 (noting that moving to a
horizontal management style requires that "top management.., build fairness into its organiza-
tion practices" to create a "trust-based environment in which people can rely on one another's
judgments and depend on one another's commitments"); Preston, supra note 83, at 2293 (noting
that to effect movement on feminist issues, there must first be a feeling of trust among all par-
ticipants).
218. See Miller, supra note 45, at 873 ("Although compromise may never entirely please
everyone, it best reflects consensus and dialogue."). Martha Minow describes the practical
problems that women face:
If we want to make a difference in areas of power, . . . we must take... established
criteria as the governing rules, even if they confine what we have to say or implicate
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to- "acceptable compromise" to "utter failure"-are inevitable whenever
people seek to change existing patterns of social behavior.
Moreover, for many employers, intra-firm negotiations will not be a
new or frightening phenomenon. Just as there are often repeat dealings
between merchants, a firm frequently has ongoing discussions with its
employees about a host of workplace issues, ranging from safety proce-
dures to which radio station to play. Seen this way, the employment
arena is not that far removed from the prototype commercial transaction.
Furthermore, although men certainly dominate management in the em-
ployment arena, women are not necessarily powerless pawns. The recent
experiments with negotiated agency regulations show that parties having
less power and experience can be effective advocates in negotiations. 19
In particular, with Title VII in force, women have leverage from their
right to litigate if discussions fail to eliminate discrimination or harass-
ment at the workplace.m Perhaps equally important, women possess sub-
stantial bargaining leverage arising from the ability to take their com-
plaints to the media. 1
us in the patterns we seek to resist.... Yet by accepting the game as it is, we risk
becoming tokens, taking our meanings and identities from those who have let us in.
Martha Minnow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 54-55
(1988). See also Bartlett, supra note 3, at 304-08, 332-33 (noting that, to be effective, change
must incorporate the past).
219. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. See also Charan, supra note 26, at 107
("[Horizontal] [n]etworks quickly surface people of exceptional competence, informal leaders
whose talents have been hidden behind functional or hierarchical walls.").
220. It is wrong to assume that because employers have the power to hire and fire employ-
ees, employees lack all power. As Philip Harter notes, in any negotiations there are numerous
sources of power, such as a party's ability to litigate if negotiations fail, the uncertainty of a ju-
dicial outcome, the costs and delays of litigation, and the ability to use media pressure. See
Harter, supra note 167, at 45. Obviously, employees possess each of these types of power in
negotiating with their employer. See Abrams, supra note 56, at 1039 (noting that non-litigation
strategies, such as education programs in the workplace, may be more effective if the threat of
litigation remains); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 152-53 (observing that negotiated
rulemaking in administrative agencies is likely to be successful if participants realize the alterna-
tive is litigation with an uncertain outcome).
221. The recent news articles concerning the sexual harassment charges against Mitsubishi
indicate the potential power of going to the media. A sampling of the articles includes:
Rochelle Carter, Lawsuit: Mitsubishi Ignored Harassment, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 1996, at 2B;
Kristen D. Grimsley et al., Woman Tells of Harassment, Breakdown, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr.
29, 1996, at 52; David Hoffman & David Southwell, Automaker Hit With Sexual Harassment
Suit, CHI. SUN-TiMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at 6; Leon Jaroff, Assembly-Line Sexism? Charges of
Abusing Women-And Angry Denials-Rock a Midwestern Mitsubishi Auto Plant, 147 TIME
MAG., May 6, 1996, at 56; Maria Shao, Mitsubishi Case Puts Spotlight on Harassment,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28, 1996, at 1; Rochelle Sharpel, EEOC Sues Mitsubishi Unit for Har-
assment, WALL ST. ., Apr. 10, 1996, at B1; Stuart Silverstein, U.S. Charges Sex Discrimina-
tion at Mitsubishi Plant, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al.
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In addition, there are ways to respond to concerns that a horizontal
jurisprudential approach will lead to codification of male-dominated rules
or only to small advances. First, utilizing a horizontal approach does not
foreclose simultaneously seeking vertical changes, either from Congress
or the Supreme Court.' Women can and should continue to lobby Con-
gress and state legislatures for statutory aid on various issues and also
pursue litigation to clarify existing laws. Second, there is no reason to
think that a male-dominated Congress or judiciary will be any more re-
ceptive to change than individual employers.' If anything, the employer
who has a financial interest in maintaining a harmonious and productive
workforce will likely be keenly interested in resolving workplace disputes
without litigation.' Third, while it is easy to talk of the need for bold
ideas and initiatives, there is no single view among women as to what
those bold ideas and initiatives should be.tm In this regard, one of the
UCC's "shortcomings" points out an important jurisprudential lesson:
not all problems are solvable by uniform, one-size-fits-all rules. Just as
there was no consensus among the UCC drafters or the states as to how to
handle certain consumer issues, z 6 so too some gender-in-employment is-
sues may require different answers in different factual settings and at dif-
222. Even proponents of negotiated solutions in other areas admit that negotiations often are
just one of a number of methods of rulemaking. See Harter, supra note 167, at 44. See also
Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1598 (1988) (noting that no one
institution by itself is likely to be able to effect change); Warren, supra note 46, at 821-22 (not-
ing that Congress-has been able to pass controversial consumer legislation for which there was
no UCC consensus because the inability to reach consensus "does not deter Congress; for Con-
gress ... need not seek consensus .... Congress can act decisively in the face of considerable
opposition").
223. With respect to the dominance of men in the federal judiciary, see sources cited supra
note 55. See also ROSENBERG, supra note 40, at 212, 214-18 (noting that employment statistics
show that even though women have "won" quite a number of legal cases, "there is little evi-
dence that these Court victories have much changed the position of women in American soci-
ety"); Larson, supra note 104, at 1252-53 (noting that having tried utilizing legislation and the
courts in the 1960s and 1970s, women are increasingly facing up to the limits of law as a vehicle
of social change); McDougall, supra note 192, at 115-18 (arguing that civil rights proponents
need to stop focusing on the Supreme Court and concentrate instead on other routes to change).
224. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. See also Bernstein, supra note 2, at
1276 (observing that Europeans place much more emphasis on in-firm resolution of sexual har-
assment problems because they are skeptical of the ability of a court to sort out the merits in any
but the most simple cases); Epstein, supra note 57, at 1052 (noting that employers have an in-
centive to set up programs to avoid discrimination disputes).
225. See supra notes 64 and 71-75 and accompanying text. In addition, there is even dispute
as to who is a woman. One can take issue with the seemingly straightforward proposition that
all women possess two X chromosomes. See Franke, supra note 1, at 43-46 (describing the dif-
ficulty of deciding whether a transgendered person is male or female).
226. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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ferent times. 27 Furthermore, even if all women agreed upon the ultimate
goals to be sought and what steps were necessary to achieve those goals,
implementation of these steps will take substantial time. Until then, small
changes are better than no changes at all,8 and the success or failure of
the small changes may lead to a modification of the "bolder" plans. 9
Here too, the recent administrative experience also helps allay some
concerns. It shows that by concentrating on relatively small issues, even
parties who are initially adverse to one another can make concrete prog-
ress within days or weeks.' 0 Even more important, it shows that having
few "yes/no" issues and a multitude of options can be a strength, not a
drawback, in negotiations.3"
Furthermore, while encouraging dialogue may be platitudinous in the
abstract, the UCC, state common and statutory law, and negotiated regu-
lations provide concrete demonstrations that a horizontal approach can
work. They also show that keeping rules closely tied to particular situa-
tions does not mean stagnation. Both the UCC and the common law have
227. Indeed, by working on specific issues at specific firms, women may avoid the very
problem that consumers had with the drafting of the UCC. See Patchel, supra note 112, at 127-
28 (noting that smaller, more cohesive and focused groups are typically better able to achieve
success in negotiations and arguing that one reason that consumers have been unsuccessful in
UCC drafting is that they are too large a group and have broad-based interests). With respect to
the advantages of small-group negotiations, see also sources cited supra note 183.
228. See Bartlett, supra note 3, at 324 (suggesting that we ought not minimize the effect of
small changes on women); Radin, supra note 3, at 1700-04 (arguing that there may be no gen-
eral solution to all gender problems and, therefore, women need to be pragmatic and look for
piecemeal, temporary solutions that may need to change over time); Resnik, supra note 5, at
1926 (arguing that feminists must "remove facades of total victory and defeat"); Schroeder, su-
pra note 13, at 197 ("In law, we must act earnestly in accordance with our best hypotheses of
justice; we cannot sit back and wait for proof, which can never come until it is too late....
[W]e must live with our best guesses."); Williams, supra note 1, at 836 (asserting that feminists
need to work "towards the kind of small, incremental steps that will gradually modify the wage-
labor system"). See also Ring, supra note 46, at 303-04 (observing, in the context of UCC
drafting, that one can pontificate at great length but it may be more beneficial to work on practi-
cal, achievable goals).
229. See Ruth Colker, The Practice of Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1252, 1284 (1993)
(noting that to the extent short-term results are inconsistent with long-term goals, women may
need to rethink their long-term goals).
230. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text. See also Charan, supra note 26, at
109-12 (noting that, within firms, a horizontal network structure works best when participants
focus on specific issues and set specific implementation dates).
231. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. In fact, Schwartz and Scott argue that one
drawback of UCC drafting is that logrolling (the trading of one provision for another) is limited
because each project deals with different issues. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 112, at 613;
Scott, supra note 112, at 1812. But see Alces & Frisch, supra note 115, at 1221 (arguing that
this is an unduly pessimistic view of UCC drafting).
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evolved dramatically. 2  Negotiated regulations, while newer and less
tested, similarly show successful results. 3 Indeed, an observation about
negotiated regulations is equally applicable to dialogues in the workplace:
"In some respects, negotiated rulemaking efforts cannot fail. At the very
least, conflicts can be clarified, data shared, and differences aired in a
constructive way. Even if full consensus is not achieved, the negotiation
process may still . . .[narrow] the issues in dispute."" Moreover, in
each instance, a horizontal jurisprudential approach has clearly contrib-
uted to the workability and societal acceptance of the legal changes.235
There are also ways to protect against discussion groups that omit
some workers or that never produce substantial progress. The most obvi-
ous deterrents are Title VII and other employment laws, which will re-
main threats to the employer who fails to develop strategies to deal suc-
cessfully with issues like sexual harassment. 36  A second deterrent to
employer procrastination can be achieved by a relatively minor alteration
to Title VII: the law can treat a firm's good faith, inclusive, and effective
in-house discussions of gender issues as a rebuttable defense or a miti-
gating factor for the employer in a sex discrimination lawsuit. 7 In as-
sessing such a defense, the trier of fact can consider both the fullness of
representation in the negotiations and the actual progress made. Obvi-
ously, in doing so, triers of fact will need to engage in case-by-case in-
quiries. However, the complexity of such exercises will be far less than
determining whether a particular mix of crude remarks and behaviors add
up to "sexual harassment.""
A horizontal approach to gender disputes in the workplace will also
provide a much-needed supplement to Title VII's reactive litigation focus.
By discussing workplace annoyances before they grow into full-blown ad-
232. See supra notes 126-35 and 144-52 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
234. Susskind & McMahon, supra note 116, at 159. See also Charan, supra note 26, at
107, 112 (noting that participants in a horizontal network "begin to see the organization through
multiple viewpoints"); Farney, supra note 162, at A12 ("[A]t a minimum, the private, feet-up-
on-the-table talks already have created a new level of understanding among interest-group lead-
ers more accustomed to strident rhetorical battles."); see also supra notes 119-21 and 169-73.
235. See supra notes 121-24 and 172.
236. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
237. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor David Dominguez, for this suggesting this
avenue of thought. See Harter, supra note 167, at 48-49 (observing that a general principle of
negotiation is that a party will participate meaningfully in negotiations only if it views itself as
better off for doing so, and in particular, negotiations will likely be more successful if the par-
ties believe that their plan will not be ignored by an alternative decisionmaker, such as a court).
238. See supra note 72.
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versarial disputes, managers and employees can act proactively to defuse
the problems. Employees will benefit by resolving conflicts before they
become so intolerable that continued employment becomes impracticable,
regardless of the success of a lawsuit. 9 In addition, such dialogues will
allow groups of workers to air their concerns, in contrast to the Title VII
lawsuit that typically pits a single employee against the firm.2" Especially
with emotionally charged issues like sexual harassment, some women may
prefer having an informal, non-confrontational means of calling attention
to the insensitivity of a remark or action and insuring its cessation, as op-
posed to bringing a Title VII lawsuit.21
From the employer's perspective a horizontal approach also has ad-
vantages. Not only does the employer potentially avoid the cost and
negative publicity of a discrimination suit, the firm also has a far greater
chance of retaining productive workers. Indeed, as a result of their dis-
cussions with employees, firms may choose to implement in-house dispute
resolution procedures. Such in-house procedures, which would be a sup-
plement to-not a displacement of-the Title VII remedies, could also be
shaped by employees and managers to fit the particular employment
situation at hand.242
239. See supra notes 109 and 110 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. See also Rhode, supra note 5, at 1186 (re-
porting that cultural studies show that women make better progress working collectively rather
than individually).
241. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text regarding Title VII litigation. See also
Abrams, supra note 66, at 1217-19 (advocating use of compliance programs to deal with sexual
harassment claims because such programs tend to be less emotionally charged, encourage rhan-
agers to participate in the rulemaking, and provide a means of "educating" all workers); Bern-
stein, supra note 2, at 1272, 1294-98 (observing that victims of sexual harassment often just
want a cessation of the offensive activity and possibly some disciplining of the offender, goals
which are more likely to be achieved through an in-house procedure as opposed to litigation);
Crain, supra note 4, at 1938 (arguing that collective action and non-litigation strategies are
likely to be quicker, less costly, and more empowering than discrimination lawsuits); Radford,
supra note 11, at 523-24 (noting that most victims of harassment, whether male or female, do
not file formal complaints). But see Epstein, supra note 61, at 442-43 (arguing that women
need lawsuits to stop sexual harassment).
242. I am not suggesting that in-house procedures ot alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
is an all-purpose remedy to the problems surrounding Title VII litigation. In particular, the lack
of formal procedures may hurt nonassertive women. See Margaret G. Farrell, Doing Unto Oth-
ers: A Proposal for Participatory Justice in Social Security's Representative Payment Program,
53 U. PrrT. L. REv. 883, 959-60 n. 269 (1992) (noting that feminists fear that ADR's infor-
mality may subordinate women to men); Preston, supra note 83, at 2318 (noting that ADR's
informality may give an advantage to those "who have traditionally been better trained to grab
any opportunity for power"); Resnik, supra note 5, at 1940-43 (voicing concern about using
ADR to resolve gender issues); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process,
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Philosophically, a horizontal jurisprudential approach is wholly con-
sistent with a number of the strong currents in feminist theory: the im-
portance of factual settings and actual cases, as opposed to abstract prin-
ciples, in yielding insights;" an emphasis on collective, web-like
relationships as a way of strengthening women's positions;2" the recogni-
tion that there is no one "community" but multiple, overlapping commu-
nities on all sides of the gender-in-employment issues;245 a willingness to
use a trial and error approach to problem solving;246 and a view of society
as dynamic and continually changing, making temporary solutions accept-
able and, indeed, inevitable.247
Conclusion
Title VII, while aiding women in the workplace, has serious limita-
tions. Given its vertical, top-down development and testing, its underly-
ing goals and assumptions lack universal support from employees, em-
ployers, and the public. In addition, Title VII's application to particular
situations is haphazard and inconsistent. In order to move ahead on gen-
der issues, a horizontal, bottom-up approach is needed to supplement Ti-
tle VII's verticality and one-size-fits-all set of rules. Employers and em-
61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1223, 1231 (1993) (arguing that ADR's informal procedures may hurt
women who are in unequal bargaining positions).
243. See Bartlett, supra note 101, at 849-63 (describing feminist practical reasoning as be-
ing sensitive to situation and context, focusing on specific, real-life situations, and acknowledg-
ing that problems may not have yes-no answers but multiple perspectives); Levit, supra note 56,
at 1050 (stating that postmodem feminism recognizes that "abstract theorizing should give way
to pragmatic, contextual solutions"); Larson, supra note 104, at 1255-56 (noting that the
women's movement is gradually moving away from a theoretical debate to a pragmatic ap-
proach); Radin, supra note 3, at 1707 (observing that feminism is committed to finding knowl-
edge in the particulars of experience); Rhode, supra note 4, at 1189-90 (arguing in favor of a
contextual analysis of issues instead of looking for an overarching theoretical framework);
Schneider, supra note 58, at 601-02 (noting that feminist methodology emphasizes personal ex-
perience as the starting place for theory).
244. See Bartlett, supra note 101, at 833 (noting the "feminist emphasis on collective, rela-
tional discovery"); Preston, supra note 83, at 2278 (describing feminism as "a celebration of
connectedness, inter-relationships, and inclusion"); Resnik, supra note 5, at 1921 ("A touch-
stone of feminism is connection[,] ... interrelatedness, . . . interdepen- dencies."); Rhode, su-
pra note 56, at 1791-93 (arguing that women need to look beyond individual achievements and
emphasize collective mobilization).
245. With respect to the variations among women and the situations they face, see supra
notes 101-03 and 183-84 and accompanying text. See also Bartlett, supra note 101, at 854-55
(noting that feminist reasoning recognizes that there is not one community but many overlapping
communities).
246. See authorities cited supra notes 185-86.
247. See authorities cited supra notes 187-88.
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ployees need to be encouraged to discuss the specific problems at their
particular workplace. We need to allow them to experiment with different
plans for addressing their specific needs. We need to give them the free-
dom to fail. Only by experimentation and learning from one another's
successes and failures are we likely to see real progress on these complex
matters. Moreover, only by talking to one another about specific prob-
lems are we likely to move away from the bitter and angry rhetoric that
currently envelopes the issues.
Just as Tolstoy recognized that "each unhappy family is unhappy in
its own way,"248 so too each workplace has its own specific gender prob-
lems. The only way to solve these problems is to augment Title VII with
workplace-specific strategies that are devised by those who will be subject
to them. After twenty years of Title VII, the time has come to acknowl-
edge that one size does not fit all, neither in sweaters nor in rules regard-
ing sex discrimination in the workplace.
248. LEo TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Constance Garnett trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1978)
(1886).
November 1997] SEX DISCRIMNATION

